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Avoiding Overtreatment at the
End of Life: Physician-Patient
Communication and Truly
Informed Consent
Barbara A. Noah* and Neal R. Feigenson**
“Life is pleasant. Death is peaceful. It’s the transition that’s
troublesome.”1
—Isaac Asimov
I.

The Problem

Americans are reluctant to acknowledge their mortality,2
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. J.D.
Harvard Law School.
** Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. J.D. Harvard
Law School.
© 2015 by Barbara A. Noah and Neal R. Feigenson. The authors
would like to thank Stephen Arons and Kathy Cerminara for their
helpful comments and suggestions.
1. This seemed like an appropriate epigraph to begin with, in part
because it begs the question of when the transition starts. And the answer to
this question is part of the problem that this article attempts to tackle—when
is the right time to start thinking about preparing for death and therefore to
consider ceasing medical efforts to prolong life? Part of the answer is that
acknowledging the reality of death sooner rather than later in life probably
makes it easier to accept when it arrives, but this is only a partial answer.
At the end of life, modern technology often makes it difficult to know when
death is imminent and when it is still a little way off. Expecting
physicians to predict imminent death with enough precision and to know
when to cease treatment or life support so that each patient dies neither a
moment too soon nor a moment too late is expecting too much.
2. Craig Bowron, Our Unrealistic Views of Death, Through a Doctor’s
Eyes,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
17,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-unrealistic-views-of-deaththrough-a-doctors-eyes/2012/01/31/gIQAeaHpJR_story.html.
(“For
many
Americans, modern medical advances have made death seem more like an
option than an obligation.”); see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, DYING IN
AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR
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and this reluctance is closely correlated with the trend toward
more medical treatment at the end of life. Recent research
suggests that a growing number of Americans—nearly onethird—believe that physicians should do everything to keep
patients alive under all circumstances.3 Seriously ill patients
and their physicians, not to mention healthy adults in general,
often avoid discussing the inevitability of death and avoid
planning for it. In the absence of such decisions, the default
treatment model focuses on preservation of life, often resulting
in overtreatment and avoidable suffering at the end of life.4
Even worse, the treatment patients receive may not be
consistent with what their informed preferences would have
been if their physicians had acknowledged the patients’
terminal prognoses, had appropriate discussions, and
documented the patients’ preferences in the medical record or
via an advance directive.
There are various ways to assess whether, on the whole,

THE END OF
AMERCIA; see

LIFE (Nat’l Acads, Press 2014) [hereinafter IOM, DYING IN
generally Barbara A. Noah, In Denial: The Role of Law in
Preparing for Death, 21 ELDER L.J. 1-31 (2013) (discussing cultural, legal, and
other reasons why patients and physicians avoid making end-of-life
decisions); see also Institute of Medicine, Dying in America: Improving
Quality and Honoring Individual Preferences Near the End of Life, available
at < http://iom.nationalacademies.org/Reports/2014/Dy.
3. See Views on End-of-Life Medical Treatments, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/11/21/views-on-end-of-lifemedical-treatments/ (noting that this belief is still the minority view—31% of
those surveyed in 2013 favored doing everything compared with 15% of those
surveyed in 1990). Some of this shift in favor of maximum treatment
resulted from the fact that more of those surveyed were willing to express an
opinion (versus choosing the option “don’t know”) but the data clearly
indicate less support for allowing patients to die in certain circumstances
(73% supported this option in 1990 versus 66% in 2013). See id.
4. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING
SOCIETY 17 (Simon & Schuster 1987) (“Not only has health been transformed
as a medical goal and social ideal, but the place of good health in individual
lives . . . has moved from the sphere of the accidental and fortuitous–where
death was once the companion of all age groups, beyond the help of medicine,
politics, and economics–to the realms of high science and established
psychological and political expectation. The technological imperatives that
transformed the nature of medicine from caring to curing have no less
profoundly affected our idea of health, moving it from a nebulous hope to a
fundamental human and social requirement. What can be done medically
ought to be done. What ought to be done ought to be available to all. What
ought to be available to all becomes the moral responsibility of all.”).
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patients are receiving “the right amount” of therapy or lifeprolonging technology. One approach is to ask whether the
treatment improves physical outcomes objectively by
prolonging life or improving quality of life. Another approach
is to consider whether the cost of administering life-prolonging
care at current levels is a wise expenditure of increasingly
scare health-care dollars. Finally, we can ask whether the
treatment is consistent with the patient’s true wishes. This is
a subjective measure in which the quality of the care is
evaluated according to its consistency with the individual
patient’s values and beliefs.
In the first part of this paper, we will explain that, by any
of these measures, many dying patients are receiving too much
therapy and life-prolonging care. We will also briefly discuss
the many factors that contribute to this state of affairs: the
culture of denial of death, physicians’ professional culture and
attitudes toward treatment, physicians’ fear of liability,
physician avoidance of discussions about prognosis, and the
impact of payment incentives that encourage overutilization of
medical technologies.
This paper’s primary focus, however, will be on considering
how best to ensure that patients have the tools to make both
informed and authentic choices about their care at the end of
life. We will argue that truly informed decision making can
help to reduce excessive end-of-life care by any measure. Most
importantly for dying patients, better informed decisions can
help reduce unnecessary suffering and result in care that
aligns with their well-considered values and preferences.
In the second part of this paper, we will explain that,
under the doctrine of informed consent, physicians have an
ethical and legal obligation to provide patients with timely and
accurate information that will enable patients to make
informed decisions about end-of-life care. Yet compliance with
informed consent law does not ensure that patients’ decisions
are truly informed and, in practice, the norm is still to provide
too much care. In the third part of the paper, we discuss
several tools and techniques that are available to help
physicians and patients achieve the goal of truly informed
decision making, including training to promote the practice of
shared decision making and the use of decision aids.
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Even with these improvements, however, decision making
at the end of life may not result in the “right amount” of care.
We therefore also explore the concept of authentic decision
making: decisions regarding end-of-life care that are fully
considered in light of a patient’s well-developed values, beliefs,
and goals of care. The ideal of authenticity requires that the
patient not only understand the nature of the treatment and its
risks and benefits (as the doctrine of informed consent
requires), but also have the emotional ability and the will to
make the decision, as well as a functional value system that
enables the patient to evaluate the appropriateness of the
choice for him or herself. This is particularly challenging
because of the uncertainty inherent in prognosis, treatment
outcomes, and adverse effects. Although we do not argue that
authenticity in this sense should or even can be legally
required, we believe it is important to articulate it as an
aspirational—and achievable—goal for decision making at the
end of life.
A.

Overutilization of Care—The Evidence

Patients say that they wish for a “good death,” but this
idea surely must mean different things to different people.
Nevertheless, most people’s idea of a “good death” likely have
some elements in common, such as avoiding physical
suffering.5 As another example, most patients state that they
would prefer to die at home.6 Yet only about 30% of patients do
5. For a review of the research on the multiple dimensions that influence
perceived quality of dying and death, see Sarah Hales et al., The Quality of
Dying and Death, 168 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 912, 912-18 (2008)
(identifying several commonly identified qualities that a “good death”
requires, such as freedom from pain and suffering, circumstances of death
(home versus hospital), and cultural variables in different studied countries
such as maintaining independence, control, self-determination, and
entrusting decisions to others). Id. at 913. For an excellent overview of the
idea of a good death and of the emotional issues surrounding death and
dying, see SHERWIN B. NULAND, HOW WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE'S FINAL
CHAPTER (Vintage Books 1995).
6. See GEORGE H. GALLUP, JR., SPIRITUAL BELIEFS AND THE DYING
PROCESS: A REPORT ON A NATIONAL SURVEY (1997) (reporting results of a
survey of U.S. residents commissioned by the Nathan Cummings Foundation
and Fetzer Institute); I.J. Higginson & G.J. Sen-Gupta, Place of Care in
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so.7 Instead, we utilize significant amounts of hospital-based
resources at the end of life,8 often with little or no measurable
benefit to dying patients. Many patients in the United States
receive aggressive interventions such as cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, ventilator support, or ICU care even when death
is imminent.9
Advanced Cancer: A Qualitative Systematic Literature Review of Patient
Preferences, 3 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 287, 287-300 (2000) (finding that despite
the fact that the majority of patients in England suffering from serious
illnesses wish to die at home, most die in either hospital or a long-term care
facility).
7. See Joan M. Teno et al., Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare
Beneficiaries: Site of Death, Place of Care, and Health Care Transitions in
2000, 2005, and 2009, 309 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 470 (2013) (concluding that,
although only 24.6% of patients died in hospital in 2009 compared with 32.6%
in 2000, percentages of deaths in long-term care facilities held steady at
around 27% and deaths at home rose from 30.7% in 2000 to 33.5% in 2009);
see also Yafu Zhao & William Encinosa, The Costs of End-of-Life
Hospitalizations, 2007, HEALTHCARE COSTS & UTILIZATION PROJECT (Nov.
2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53605/ (describing data from
2007 indicating that one-third of Americans died in hospital); Jeanne Lenzer,
Unnecessary Care: Are Doctors in Denial and is Profit Driven Healthcare to
Blame?, 345 BRIT. MED. J. e6230 (2012) (referring to another estimate that
65% of deaths in the United States occur in hospitals). Yet another study
found that 45% of U.S. deaths occur in hospitals and 22% in long term care
facilities. See DIV. VITAL STATISTICS, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
DEATHS FROM 39 SELECTED CAUSES BY PLACE OF DEATH, STATUS OF DECEDENT
WHEN DEATH OCCURRED IN HOSPITAL OR MEDICAL CENTER, AND AGE: UNITED
STATES,
1999-2005
(2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality/gmwk307.htm.
8. It is well documented that one-third of medical expenses for the last
year of life are spent in the final month and that aggressive therapies and
technologies in that final month account for nearly 80 percent of these costs.
See Baohui Zhang et al., Health Care Costs in the Last Week of Life:
Associations with End-of-Life Conversations, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
480, 482-84 (2009). Moreover, 30 percent of Medicare dollars spent go to care
for the 5 percent of Medicare beneficiaries who die each year. See Amber E.
Barnato et al., Trends in Inpatient Treatment Intensity Among Medicare
Beneficiaries at the End of Life, 39 HEALTH SERV. RES. 363, 363-64 (2004); see
also Teno, supra note 7, at 473 tbl. 2 (noting that, in 2009, 29.2% of patients
who died had received care in an ICU in the previous 30 days); Donald M.
Berwick & Andrew Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in U.S. Health Care, 307 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 1513 (2012) (describing 6 categories of health care spending
waste, including overtreatment such as use of surgery when watchful waiting
is better and unwanted intensive care at the end of life and estimating that
wasteful spending in the overtreatment category accounts form between $158
billion and $226 billion in 2011).
9. See Amresh Hanchate et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in End-ofLife Costs: Why Do Minorities Cost More than Whites?, 169 ARCHIVES
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These trends are worsening. The most recent data indicate
that, in 2009, 28.4% of patients received hospice care for only
three days or fewer before dying, an increase from 22.2% nine
years earlier.
Moreover, 29.2% of Medicare beneficiaries
remained in an ICU during the final month of life compared
with 24.3% in the earlier period.10
This pattern of
overutilization of care at end of life results in situations where
dying patients continue to receive costly therapeutic care and
life-prolonging treatment even when it is very likely that the
benefits in terms of enhanced quality of life, increased survival
time, or other measurable physical outcomes are limited or
non-existent.11 At the same time, we underutilize hospice and
INTERNAL MED. 493, 497-98 (2009) (surveying use of expensive end of life
interventions among a large sample of Medicare beneficiaries and finding
patterns of substantial expenditure on life-sustaining treatment in the final
six months of life). One palliative care specialist describes the ICU as a place
“where a Wild West culture makes it a challenge for palliative care to get a
foothold,” adding that it is difficult “to slow a wild horse, particularly one that
believes it can outrace death.” Jessica Nutik Zitter, They Call Me ‘Dr.
Kevorkian,’
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
14,
2013,
1:37
PM),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/they-call-me-dr-kevorkian/ (adding
that she “believe[s] in letting the dying determine how and when they die, as
opposed to coaxing their organs at all costs”).
10. See Teno, supra note 7, at 471-73 & tbl. 2 (also finding that 11.5% of
patients had been hospitalized three or more times in the three months
before death, up from 10.3% in the previous studied period).
11. In a very recent study that attempts to measure physicians’
perceptions of when they are delivering “futile” care to their patients, the
data suggested that approximately 20% of patients in 5 critical care units
were receiving futile or “probably futile” treatment. See Thanh N. Huynh et
al., The Frequency and Cost of Treatment Perceived to Be Futile in Critical
Care, J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. E1, E3-E4 and fig. 1 (Sept. 9, 2013).
The survey instrument defined five situations in which treatment might be
considered futile or medically inappropriate: burdens grossly outweigh
benefits; patient will never survive outside an ICU; patient is permanently
unconscious; treatment cannot achieve the patient’s goals; death is imminent.
See id. at E2. See also Robert D. Truog & Douglas B. White, Futile
Treatments in Intensive Care Units, J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. (Sept.
9, 2013) (critiquing the study design, arguing that legal complexities make it
difficult for physicians to say “no” to futile treatment requests, and pleading
for better communication and a conflict resolution process to address these
situations); R. Sean Morrison et al., When Too Much Is Too Little, 335 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1755, 1755-56 (1996) (describing a case of aggressive treatment
of an elderly patient with advanced, terminal disease despite his repeated
requests that he receive no further treatment and observing that such overtreatment interferes with quality of life for these patients with little
offsetting benefit).
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palliative care.12 The challenge is to identify those situations
in which over-treatment is occurring (or is likely to occur) and
to respond with treatment that is both clinically appropriate
and consistent with the patient’s wishes. Given that every
patient is unique and end-of-life preferences and goals of care
vary, this is not a simple process.
In the context of terminal illness, many people believe that
more therapeutic care (such as tests, procedures, lifesupportive measures and drug therapies) leads to longer life
and improved physical well-being.13
We have all heard
grieving families assure others that “the doctors did everything
they could.” “Doing everything” may help to alleviate feelings
of distress or helplessness on the part of families and
physicians, but it is not necessarily in the patient’s best
interests.14 In fact, a growing body of evidence demonstrates
that an emphasis on palliative care,15 in conjunction with
12. See Teno, supra note 7, at 474 (noting that, although the use of
hospice services has increased during the early 2000s, only 42.2% of Medicare
beneficiaries with dementia and 59.5% of Medicare beneficiaries with cancer
received hospice services at the time of death); Corita Grudzen & Deborah
Grady, Improving Care at the End of Life, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1202,
1202-04 (2011) (discussing over-use of therapeutic interventions at the end of
life and advocating that better quality care often requires emphasizing
palliative measures and avoiding unavailing therapies that risk unnecessary
suffering and iatrogenic harm); Haiden A. Huskamp et al., Discussions with
Physicians About Hospice Among Patients with Metastatic Lung Cancer, 169
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 954, 955-56 (2009) (finding that only half of
patients with stage IV lung cancer had had any discussion with their
physicians about hospice in the two months prior to death). These patterns
are even more marked among racial and ethnic minorities in the United
States. See generally Barbara A. Noah, The Role of Race in End-of-Life Care,
15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 349-78 (2012).
13. See Sean Palfrey, Daring to Practice Low-Cost Medicine in a HighTech
Era,
NEW
ENG.
J.
MED.
(2011),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1101392?ssource’hcrc.pdf.
(commenting on the mistaken belief that “ “‘doing everything’ is the best
practice and the way to prevent harm”); Grudzen, supra note 12 (discussing
comparative outcomes in the end of life care for three patients).
14. See Bowron, supra note 2.
15. “Palliative care” refers to medical care intended to alleviate
symptoms associated with illness, whatever the patient’s prognosis. Such
care may address pain, shortness of breath, insomnia, depression, nausea
and lack of appetite, among other symptoms. See Lise M. Stevens, Palliative
Care, 296 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1428 (2006). Palliative care is often appropriate
even while the patient is receiving therapeutic care; the two are not mutually
exclusive. Once therapeutic care is discontinued, palliative care continues in
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carefully considered therapeutic care, can improve patients’
quality of life and even prolong survival.16
An example helps to illustrate the seriousness of the
problem and how easily the care of dying patients can go awry.
A 73-year-old man was admitted via the emergency room
complaining of progressive weakness on his left side.17 A CT
indicated lung cancer with metastasis in the brain. The
patient refused further invasive tests, including biopsy of the
lung tumor, explaining that he had watched his wife die of lung
cancer and did not want tests or life-prolonging treatment.
Various physicians again pressed the patient to undergo lung
biopsy and he then agreed. The biopsy confirmed lung cancer.
The patient refused surgery to resect the cancer in the lung
and brain and was discharged after 21 days in the hospital
with full-time home care.18 The patient was readmitted to the
hospital three months later after suffering three grand mal
seizures. A CT scan indicated that the brain mass had
worsened; the patient continued to suffer seizures, could not
talk, and was lethargic. The patient’s son requested a DNR
order to manage symptoms.
16. See Jennifer S. Temel et al., Early Palliative Care for Patients with
Metastatic Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 733, 736-38
(2010) (finding that patients recently diagnosed with lung cancer who began
receiving palliative care immediately lived an average of three months longer
than patients who received standard therapeutic treatment only); Matthijs
Kox & Peter Pickkers, “Less Is More” in Critically Ill Patients Not Too
Intensive, 173 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1369 (2013) (concluding,
based on a meta-analysis of multiple clinical trials, that many common
treatments for critically ill patients pose a high risk of iatrogenic harm
compared with their potential benefit and ought to be used more cautiously).
17. See Morrison, supra note 11 (describing a case of aggressive
treatment of an elderly patient with advanced, terminal disease despite his
repeated requests that he receive no further treatment and observing that
such over-treatment interferes with quality of life for these patients with
little offsetting benefit).
18. One of the commentators on the case observed that, at that point,
“He wants to return home as soon as possible and lead as normal a life as he
can for as long as he can. With such a large brain lesion and lung mass, it is
unlikely that he could be cured, and he should have been told this. He should
also have been told that . . . the survival is generally longer after surgical
resection than with no therapy or radiation therapy alone. However, we
must remember that it is his choice.” Id. at 1756. Of course, the patient’s
“choice” is only meaningful if he has received the additional information.
Failing to provide this information makes “his choice” a bit hollow in
retrospect.
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order based on his father’s prior wishes. The neurology team
again recommended surgery to resect the tumor in the brain
but the family declined. Over the next three weeks the patient
received oxygen, various fluids and drugs via an IV, multiple
blood tests and additional CT scans, and was fed via a
nasogastric tube. Although he was minimally responsive, he
managed to remove the NG tube multiple times. He was then
placed in restraints and, after 24 days of hospitalization, the
family was persuaded to consent to a gastronomy tube for
feeding. The tube was surgically inserted on the 29th day of
hospitalization. The patient had a cardiopulmonary arrest and
died the following day.19
This example illustrates several of the measures of
overutilization of care described above. The patient clearly
suffered unnecessarily and also very likely incurred additional
health care costs. Most importantly, the care he received was
inconsistent with his expressed wishes. The patient was quite
clear about his refusal of life-prolonging care. He went home
and skipped all follow-up appointments. Nevertheless, he
spent his final month of life in the hospital, attached to various
tubes and restrained to prevent him from removing them. His
family appears to have wavered between respecting his wishes
and being persuaded to do more. As one physician put it, “We
want our loved ones to live as long as possible, but our culture
has come to view death as a medical failure rather than life’s
natural conclusion . . . When their loved one does die, family
members can tell themselves, ‘We did everything we could for
Mom’ In my experiences, this is a stronger inclination than the
equally valid (and perhaps more honest) admission that ‘we
sure put Dad through the wringer.’”20

19. Id. at 1757. For another similar example of physician resistance and
family ambivalence to withholding treatment, see Kathleen Bartholomew,
“Saving” Bonnie, 174 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 13 (2014) (describing
a dying 88 year old woman who, as a Christian Scientist had no regular
medical care from physicians, and the refusal of an emergency room
physician to write a DNR order at the request of the patient and her
daughter-in-law (the author) because he didn’t “feel comfortable”).
20. See Bowron, supra note 2.
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Causes of Overutilization of Care at the End of Life

How and why does this sort of excessive end-of-life care
come about so routinely? Broadly speaking, our medical
system operates within a culture of denial of death. A
combination of trends provides evidence of denial. Longer
average lifespans, together with the promise of new therapies,
encourages individuals to avoid confronting mortality. Some
researchers now talk of doubling the human life span, even of a
“cure for death,” and of aging as a “disease” that should be
“treated.”21
Although commentators have criticized this
22
mindset, research into lifespan extension continues with little
regard for the consequences of the distorted message it sends.23
This quest for a fountain of youth denies the reality of
mortality, and ignores the fact that more days or years of life
do not necessarily guarantee more quality of life or more
happiness. In addition, cultural portrayals of older people
create more ambivalence about aging. We hear phrases like
“fifty is the new thirty” and see advertisements for “adult
communities” depicting vigorous, tanned septuagenarians
playing golf and tennis. At the same time, unlike other
animals, we are conscious of our own mortality, which creates,
at least for some, unsettling feelings of ambivalence. The

21. Closing in on the Cure for Death, FIGHT AGING (Sept. 2, 2003),
https://www.fightaging.org/archives/2003/09/closing-in-on-the-cure-fordeath.php; see also Penni Crabtree, Fountain of Youth with Just a Shot in the
Arm?, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 25, 2004, at Al (describing the Institute's
claims and explaining that mainstream science has debunked anti-aging
claims as "hucksterism" that offers little or no benefit but poses potentially
serious health risks).
22. See Daniel Callahan, Death and the Research Imperative, 342 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 654, 654-55 (2000) (quoting William Haseltine, then CEO of
Human Genome Sciences as saying that "[d]eath is a series of preventable
diseases" and arguing that research "should not, even implicitly, have
eradication of death as its goal" because it supplants emphasis on the
importance of relieving suffering at the end of life and it "promotes the idea
among the public and physicians that death represents a failure of
medicine.").
23. Recent news stories document the efforts of tech billionaires to fund
research into lifespan extension. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, Tech Titans’
Latest
Project:
Defy
Death,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
4,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/04/04/tech-titans-latestproject-defy-death/.
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philosopher Ernst Becker captured the paradox eloquently:
“Man is literally split in two: he has an awareness of his own
splendid uniqueness . . . and yet he goes back into the ground
in order blindly and dumbly to rot . . . .”24 These cultural
influences have played a significant role in transforming the
natural process of dying into a technologically-driven and,
often, illogically overzealous prolongation of the lives of
terminally ill patients. It is also no surprise that, in this
culture of denial, many people avoid planning for the end of life
until the matter becomes urgent, and may try to avoid it even
then.
Physicians’ professional culture also appears to contribute
to the problem. Physicians themselves sometimes exhibit a
striking reluctance to cease curative care for their patients,
acknowledge their dying, and focus on symptom management
instead of continuing to treat the illness aggressively.
Commentators have noted that physicians’ attitudes towards
these issues can vary according to their specialty.25 Surgeons,
for example, have difficulty relinquishing control over postsurgical patients because they fear retrospective censure about
the appropriateness of the decision to perform the surgery, or
because of guilt or “ego alienation” if the patient is faring
poorly.26 One physician tells a story of an oncologist who was
upset about his patient’s decision to stop chemotherapy and
enroll in a hospice program. The oncologist confronted the
hospice physician and said, “We might as well just be walking
away, and we might just as well shoot [the patient] now.”27
Interestingly, physicians themselves, when facing death,
frequently refuse invasive treatment, including CPR,
preferring instead to accept the prognosis and spend their

24. ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 26 (The Free Press 1973).
25. See Soumitra R. Eachempati et al., The Surgical Intensivist as
Mediator of End-of-Life Issues in the Care of Critically Ill Patients, 197 J. AM.
COLL. SURGEONS. 847, 849-51 (2003).
26. See id. at 850 (adding that surgeons may also wish to avoid
appearing to lack confidence in themselves or may worry that losing a
surgical patient will ruin their statistical success numbers).
27. See Kevin B. O’Reilly, End-of-Life Care: Pain Control Carries Risk of
Being
Called
a
Killer,
AM. MED. NEWS
(Apr.
16,
2012),
http://www.amednews.com/article/20120416/profession/304169955/2/
(relating an anecdote from a physician who directs a hospice program).
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remaining time feeling as well as possible.28
Another cause of overutilization of medical tests and
interventions is the fear of making a medical error or being
accused of hastening death, with the accompanying prospect of
malpractice litigation.29 Fear of liability, together with a
reluctance to deprive patients of hope, has created a culture in
which physicians may hesitate even to raise the question of
withdrawal or withholding of therapeutic or life-sustaining
medical care unless the patient or family initiates the
conversation. And physicians are justified in this concern: The
data suggest that a significant number of physicians in the
United States have been accused of, investigated for, and
occasionally prosecuted for murder and euthanasia in
circumstances in which they discontinued life-supportive
measures, provided drugs for pain control, or sedated patients
28. See Teresa A. Hillier et al., Physicians as Patients: Choices
Regarding Their Own Resuscitation, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1289,
1289-92 (1995) (describing a study in which physicians were asked whether
they would want cardiopulmonary resuscitation if diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s Disease, or various other advanced chronic diseases at various
ages and finding that at all projected ages, most physicians would not want
CPR, particularly with advancing age); Gregory P. Gramelspacher et al.,
Preferences of Physicians and Their Patients for End-of-Life Care, 12 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 346, 349-50 (1997) (finding that physicians preferred
significantly less care at end of life than patients usually receive); cf. Garrett
M. Chinn et al., Physicians’ Preferences for Hospice if They Were Terminally
Ill and the Timing of Hospice Discussions With Their Patients, 174 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 466 at E1, E1-E2 (finding that physicians who
preferred hospice for themselves were more likely to discuss hospice with
terminally ill cancer patients); Ken Murray, How Doctors Die: It’s Not Like
the Rest of Us, But it Should Be, ZOCALO PUB. SQUARE (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://zocalopublicsquare.org/thepublicsquare/2011/11/30/how-doctorsdie/read/nexus.
29. See Alan Meisel et al., Seven Legal Barriers to End-of-Life Care:
Myths, Realities, and Grains of Truth, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2495, 2495
(2000) (explaining that physicians overestimate the risk of malpractice
lawsuits and that poor communication by physicians about end-of-life issues
increased the risk of litigation); Palfrey, supra note 13, at e(21)(1) (“Most
doctors are intensely risk-averse. We don’t tolerate uncertainty. Not
wanting anything bad to happen, we reflexively overtest and overtreat in
order to protect our patients—and ourselves.”); Phillip Wickenden Bale,
Honoring Patients’ Wishes for Less Health Care, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1200 (2011) (describing the repeated hospitalization of a very elderly patient
in a long term care facility in contravention of surrogate decision-makers’
request to provide only comfort care in apparent reaction to a government
fine of the facility due to the accidental death of another patient).
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whose suffering they were unable to alleviate in other ways.30
Yet continuing inappropriate or “aggressive” care also poses
risks of iatrogenic harm and additional pain or discomfort,
often with no discernable offsetting medical benefit.
As
commentators have recognized, sometimes less is more; there is
a real risk of harm “in an environment that values treatment
over care.”31
It is difficult to say precisely how much unnecessary care
at the end of life results from patient and family requests for
such care and how much is the result of physicians’
unwillingness to be candid about the likely ineffectiveness of
the care in prolonging life or improving quality of life.
Nevertheless, there is clearly a causal connection between
overtreatment at the end of life and poor communication
between physicians and patients. Research suggests that
physicians avoid or delay disclosing details about patients’
prognoses or spontaneously initiating discussions about ending
therapeutic care and making the transition to hospice.32 With
respect to patients with likely incurable cancers, research
demonstrates that, while two-thirds of physicians tell their
patients at the initial visit that they have an incurable form of
cancer, only one-third ever state the prognosis at any point in
30. See Nathan E. Goldstein et al., Prevalence of Formal Accusations of
Murder and Euthanasia Against Physicians, 15 J. PALLIATIVE. MED. 334
(2012) (finding, based on survey data, that over half of respondents had been
accused of euthanasia or murder by a patient or patient’s family member
within the previous five years and 4% of those surveyed had been formally
investigated for hastening a patient’s death); Lewis Cohen et al., Accusations
of Murder and Euthanasia in End-of-Life Care, 8 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1096,
1096-97, 1101 (2005) (describing examples of such accusations along with
occasional prosecutions and providing data for rates of prosecution in end of
life care cases).
31. See, e.g., Grudzen & Grady, supra note 12, at 1202.
32. See, e.g., Nancy L. Keating et al., Physician Factors Associated With
Discussions About End-of-Life Care, 116 CANCER, 998 (2010) (concluding that
most physicians surveyed indicated that they would not discuss end of life
decisions and choices with terminally ill patients until they exhibited
symptoms or there were no remaining treatments available); Bethel Ann
Powers et al., Meaning and Practice of Palliative Care for Hospitalized Older
Adults with Life Limiting Illnesses, 2011 J. AGING RESEARCH (2011)
(discussing the distinctions between and intersection of palliative care and
end of life care and recommending better training of health care providers to
understand that “end of life” is not a “well-demarcated period of time before
death.”).
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the relationship.33 Physicians also tend to overestimate the
remaining life spans of seriously ill patients and to convey
prognoses in overly optimistic terms.34
Even worse, a
surprising number of physicians acknowledge deliberately
deceiving patients when discussing prognoses. In a recent
survey of physicians, one in ten physicians admitted to lying to
a patient within the previous year, and over half acknowledged
that they had been unreasonably optimistic about a patient’s
prognosis.35 Moreover, physicians report that even when
33. See Belinda E. Kiely et al., Thinking and Talking About Life
Expectancy in Incurable Cancer, 38 SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY 380, 380-81
(2011).
34. See Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and
Determinants of Error in Doctors’ Prognoses in Terminally Ill Patients, 320
BRIT. MED. J. 469, 470-71 (2000) (finding that, in predicting patients’
remaining life expectancies, physicians were correct only 20 percent of the
time and were over-optimistic 63 percent of the time and concluding that a
closer doctor-patient relationship was associated with over-optimistic
predictions); Elizabeth B. Lamont & Nicholas A. Christakis, Prognostic
Disclosure to Patients with Cancer Near the End of Life, 134 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 1096 (2001) (finding that, in communicating expected
survival times to patients with terminal cancer, physicians were frank with
patients only 37% of the time, provided deliberately inaccurate survival
estimates 40.3% of the time and preferred to offer no estimate for 22.7% of
the patients studied). The authors concluded that “for all of these patients,
physicians were able and willing to formulate objective prognoses, whether
accurate or not, but had difficulty communicating them, even to insistent
patients.”; cf. Elisa J. Gordon & Christopher K. Daugherty, ‘Hitting You Over
the Head:” Oncologists’ Disclosure of Prognosis to Advanced Cancer Patients,
17 BIOETHICS 142, 142-68 (2003) (describing the results of a small focus group
discussion with physicians in which many expressed reluctance to convey
statistical details about prognosis because they felt that the information
would seem too abrupt and would interfere with patients’ hope).
35. See Lisa I. Lezzoni, et al., Survey Shows That at Least Some
Physicians Are Not Always Open or Honest with Patients, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS
383, 383-88 (2012); Sandeep Jauhar, The Lies That Doctors and Patients Tell,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
20,
2014,
10:21
AM),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/the-lies-that-doctors-and-patientstell/?_r=0 (explaining, with reference to his over-treatment of a very elderly
and dying patient, that “[a]t their core, my actions were a kind of deception–
convincing myself, despite all the evidence, that I could save her, stay the
inexorable course of her disease. Perhaps I was afraid of failure, or
embarrassed by my impotence. Those last few days of her life she almost
ceased to be a person for me. She became an experiment, a puzzle—one that I
desperately wanted to solve.”); cf. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993)
(involving a claim by a deceased patient’s family that the physicians’ failure
to disclose specific information about survival rates and times with
pancreatic cancer impaired the patient’s ability to get his financial and
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cancer patients specifically request prognostic estimates, they
would withhold their opinion or provide a willfully inaccurate
figure in almost two-thirds of cases.36 This increases the risk
that patients will pursue aggressive and debilitating
treatments in the hope of prolonging life without fully
understanding the implications of this choice.37
Even when patients and families are generally well
informed about medical matters, avoiding end-of-life decisions
appears common. In a recent article in the Hastings Center
Report, one of the authors (a doctoral candidate in a wellregarded medical humanities program) describes her mother’s
struggle with advanced ovarian cancer and her attempts to
protect her mother from hearing the truth of her prognosis.38
After a brief remission following “countless rounds of
aggressive chemotherapy,” the cancer had metastasized to the
patient’s brain, yet no physician ever stated that the cancer
was no longer curable or mentioned dying. Just one day after
the patient’s oncologist came by to discuss his recommendation
of a new chemotherapy (which would have been the patient’s
fifth), a palliative care physician explained that they should
talk about the mother’s “options” because “things didn’t look
good” on recent scans. The patient decided to start hospice
care, explaining that she felt “incredibly relieved” not to have
to fight any more. She died the next day.39
This story illustrates a couple of common and problematic
issues. First, physicians will avoid having “the conversation,”
especially if the patient and family also carefully avoid raising
business affairs in order). Of course, if the patient’s preference is to avoid
receiving explicit information about prognosis, this is a different matter. See
infra notes 66 - 76, and accompanying text.
36. See E.B. Lamont & N.A. Christakis, Prognostic Disclosure to Patients
with Cancer Near the End of Life, 134 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1096, 1096-98
(2001) (concluding that physicians would provide a honest estimate only 37%
of the time and would provide no estimate, or a deliberate overestimate or
underestimate 63 % of the time).
37. See supra notes 32- 36 and accompanying text (discussing physicians’
and patients’ over-optimism with respect to therapeutic benefits of treatment.
38. See Nicole M. Piemonte & Laura Hermer, Avoiding a “Death Panel”
Redux, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 20-21 (2013).
39. See id. (The daughter added that “I could not believe that the
conversation I had dreaded most, the words that I thought would destroy my
mother, had given her such a deep and profound sense of peace.”).
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questions about prognosis. Second, the current system creates
an artificial dichotomy between curative and palliative care.
Physicians who practice in the “curative” role tend to focus on
clinical problem solving, will continue to advocate for therapy
even when the prognosis is grim, and may often view death as
a failure. Physicians who practice in the “palliative care” role
focus on the patient as a whole person rather than as a disease
diagnosis and will view unnecessary suffering at the end of life
as a failure. When, however, care for a seriously ill patient
integrates curative goals (for as long as they are clinically
appropriate) with palliative goals, the patient, the family, and
the physicians are better off. There is no reason to keep these
goals separate or to provide these two types of care only
sequentially.40
All of these problems are made worse by the fact that the
system of reimbursement for health care in the United States
often deforms the goals of care by paying physicians who
provide more treatments and tests while failing to reimburse
physicians for the more time-consuming and emotionally
onerous task of discussing with patients the option of doing
less. The Medicare program reimburses physicians and
hospitals on a fee-for-service basis. Simply put, this means
that the more treatments, tests, and procedures the patient
receives, the more reimbursement the physician and/or
hospital will receive.41 Even not-for-profit hospitals need to
40. There is much more to be said on the integration of curative and
palliative care, but this is outside the scope of this article. For an excellent
treatment of this topic, see Laura P. Gelfman & Diane E. Meier, Making the
Case for Palliative Care: An Opportunity for Health Care Reform, 8 J. HEALTH
& BIOMEDICAL L. 57 (2012); Marie Bakitas, et al., Oncologists’ Perspectives on
Concurrent Palliative Care in an NCI-designated Comprehensive Cancer
Center, 11 PALLIATIVE SUPPORT CARE 415 (2013).
41. See, e.g., Stephen F. Jencks et al., Rehospitalizations Among Patients
in the Medicare Fee-for-Service Program, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1418, 1419
(2009) (discussing the Medicare fee-for-service reimbursement system in the
context of rates of rehospitalization for Medicare beneficiaries); Robert
Steinbrook, The End of Fee-for-Service Medicine? Proposals for Payment
Reform in Massachusetts, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED 1036, 1036 (2009) (discussing
the incentives for overutilization of medical services created by a fee-forservice payment system). There is some promising news on this front. The
U.S. recently passed a bill that will attempt to remedy the worst effects of
fee-for-service medicine in the Medicare Program.
The revamped
reimbursement system will pay physicians based on the quality of the care
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keep their “patient census” high—their beds full—in order to
avoid a deficit. Many commentators have recognized the
general problem of overutilization of health care resources and
have recommended the implementation of various programs
designed to target this problem.42
Until very recently, attempts by the Obama administration
to enact a provision to compensate physicians for discussing
end-of-life planning with patients in the Medicare program
have been derailed by “death panel” accusations.43 Despite
repeated corrections of false statements regarding the content
and intent of these regulatory proposals, recent polls showed
that 41% of those surveyed continue to believe that reforms in
the Affordable Care Act include panels that will opine on
patients’ fitness to receive health care or will promote
euthanasia.44 Nevertheless, in July, 2015, the Centers for
they deliver rather than the quantity of care. See Carol W. Cassella, Keep
Patients Healthy, and Doctors Sane, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/opinion/keep-patients-healthy-anddoctors-sane.html?_r=0; see also Siobhan Hughes, House Passes Medicare
‘Doc
Fix’
Bill,
WALL ST. J.
(Mar.
26,
2015,
7:03
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-passes-medicare-doc-fix-bill-1427386278.
42. See, e.g., Christine K. Cassel & James A. Guest, Choosing Wisely:
Helping Physicians and Patients Make Smart Decisions About Their Care,
307 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1801, 1801 (2012) (describing various programs such
as Choosing Wisely, Less is More, and the Good Stewardship Working Group
that aim to educate physicians about commonly over-utilized tests and
procedures).
43. See Earl Blumenauer, My Near Death Panel Experience, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2009, at WK12 (describing U.S. Rep. Blumenauer’s efforts to
implement Medicare reimbursement for this service and political uproar that
followed, including a series of blatant falsehoods about the proposal offered
up by its opponents); Robert Pear, Medicare Rule Urges Planning for End of
Life, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2010, at A13 (discussing the initial Medicare
regulation and the provision in the Affordable Care Act); Kevin B. O’Reilly,
76% of Patients Neglect End-of-Life Care Planning, AM. MED. NEWS (Feb. 27,
2012), http://www.amednews.com/article/20120227/profession/
302279943/6/; cf. Benjamin Anastas, The Foul Reign of Emerson’s ‘SelfReliance,’ N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 2, 2011 at MM58 (discussing, as a modern
result of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Self-Reliance,” “the American affliction of
ignoring volumes of evidence in favor of the flashes that meet the eye, the
hunches that seize the gut”).
44. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS-GFK POLL: HEALTH
CARE
REFORM
(Sept.
25,
2012),
http://surveys.ap.org/data%5CGfK%5CHealthReform_2012_Topline_1st%20r
elease.pdf; Kaiser Health Tracking Poll – July 2010, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(July
29,
2010),
http://kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-
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Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMMS) issued a proposed
rule that would reimburse physicians and other qualified
health professionals such as nurse practitioners for having one
or more discussions with Medicare patients and families about
advance care planning.45 There now appears to be sufficient
political support for these provisions to enable them to become
final, though there remains a risk of obstruction from
organizations such as the National Right to Life Committee,
which argues that payment for advance care planning creates a
bias against life-prolonging treatment and could exert pressure
on some people to forego medical treatment in order to reduce
costs.46
Finally, all of this extra medical spending at the end of life
does not appear to improve quality of care. Recent studies
have concluded that dramatic spending differences on end of
life care among different counties in the United States have
very little measurable effect on quality of care.47 To be clear,
tracking-poll-july-2010/ (finding that 36% of senior citizens still believe that
the health reform law will allow government panels to make end of life
decisions for Medicare beneficiaries).
45. See Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the
Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2016, 80 Fed.
Reg. 41,686, 41,773 (July 15, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 410,
411, 414) (providing two new payment codes for advance care planning
including the explanation and discussion of advance directives such as
standard forms (with completion of such forms, when performed), by the
physician or other qualified health professional—one code for the first 30
minutes, face-to-face with the patient, family member(s) and/or surrogate and
an second payment code for each additional 30 minutes of discussion and
advance directive completion).
46. See Pam Belluck, Medicare Plans to Pay Doctors for Counseling on
End of Life, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A1.
47. See Janice Hopkins Tanne, High Quality, Low Cost Healthcare Can
Be Provided in U.S., Experts Say, 344 BRIT. MED. J. e1190 (2012) (explaining
that “[t]he programme showed that some U.S. counties spend $17,000 (10,800
pounds; 13,000 euros) per person annually on healthcare for people over 65
years, whereas others provide equally good care for just $6000.”). Elliott
Fisher, professor of medicine at Dartmouth University, New Hampshire,
said: “We could cover everybody without spending more,” adding that excess
spending in the U.S. goes on hospitalization rather than outpatient care,
specialist visits rather than care by primary physicians, and unnecessary
tests and procedures. “If all hospitals adopted the practices of the lower
spending regions, health care costs would go down by 30%, saving $700bn to
$800bn per year.” Id.; see also THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE,
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2016)
(providing state by state data on various aspects of end of life care).
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the focus of this paper is on improving communication and
quality of care at the end of life, not on cost reduction.48
Although the issue is complex and the data inadequate to
support any predictions, cost savings would be a fortunate side
effect of achieving the central goal of providing patients with
relevant information about their choices and encouraging them
to think about and articulate to their health care providers
their authentic end-of-life choices.49
C.

Calibrating Care Based on Patients’ Informed Wishes

These systemic problems, together with the general
reluctance to confront end-of-life decision making until the
question becomes unavoidable, means that many end of life
discussions happen too late or not at all. While we will argue
that improved and timely communication between physicians
and patients and families at the end of life may result in
improved quality of life, reduced overutilization of care, and
48. There is little evidence that guidelines for end-of-life care reduce
costs, and at the same time there is a great deal of risk that discussing cost
reduction in the same conversation with ideas about improving end-of-life
care by reducing over-treatment will generate controversy (to put it mildly).
In the U.S. cultural climate, discussion of cost savings in conjunction with
discussions about minimizing inappropriate treatment or life-supportive
measures leads to public outcry while reducing opportunities for clear-headed
conversation about how to improve care at the end of life. And, because high
quality palliative and hospice care also costs money, it is unclear how much
savings would accrue if we were able to achieve a substantial system-wide
reduction in ICU care and hospitalization at the end of life in favor of
emphasis on palliative and hospice care. Therefore, it is probably better to
keep these issues separate and trust that cost savings may prove to be a
positive side effect of improved end of life care. In any event, as this article
explains, there are other, better reasons for making these changes.
49. See Steven J. Katz & Sarah Hawley, The Value of Sharing Treatment
Decision Making With Patients: Expecting Too Much?, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1559, 1560 (2013) (questioning the design of studies suggesting that shared
decision making reduces health care spending in general and noting that
“there is no evidence that patient preferences would inherently favor less
extensive treatments than recommendations made by their physicians”); cf.
Abigail Zuger, Testing the Limits of ‘Terminal,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2013, at
D6 (describing the case of an acutely ill patient who was deemed “terminal”
and thus denied ICU care and, arguing that ICU care would have been
appropriate for this patient: “What are health care dollars, really, but
bitcoins to feed time’s meter till mind, brain and body are all in the same
place?”).
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reduced risk of physician malpractice liability, the primary
focus of this paper is on a different but related measure of
quality of care at the end of life: whether the care that a
patient receives comports with his or her preferences and goals
for care.50 On this measure, “good medical care” can include
the entire range of options from minimal treatment and
emphasis on comfort care to providing all life-prolonging care
in cases where the patient’s goal is maximal life-extension.
The autonomy principle that undergirds end of life decisions
protects each individual patient’s goals of care, whatever they
may be.51 In order to evaluate whether quality of care is
consistent with that principle, we must focus on the patient’s
level of understanding about the medical interventions he or
she accepts (or rejects) rather than the medical outcomes of
those decisions.
The law of informed consent, as explained in the next part
of this paper, provides some protection for patients in this
regard. It requires that patients receive information about
risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment and that health
care providers and institutions document that consent.52
Informed consent alone should not, however, constitute the
ultimate goal for this measure of quality of care. As other
50. See Jaime S. King et al., Toward the ‘Tipping Point’: Decision Aids
and Informed Patient Choice, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 716, 716 (2007)
(distinguishing between “effective” treatments and “preference-sensitive”
treatments for which the best choice is measured according to how patients
rate benefits versus harms).
51. Physicians and health care institutions of course retain the right and
responsibility not to provide medically futile care—care that cannot as a
scientific matter reasonably achieve the medical goals sought. Futility
questions arise in two categories—questions of subjective value of the
proposed medical intervention and questions about the probability of whether
the medical intervention will be successful. See Robert D. Truog et al., The
Problem with Futility, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1560, 1561 (1992). When it is
clear that a proposed medical intervention simply will not accomplish its
intended goal, physicians have no ethical or legal obligation to provide this
care. Commentators now recommend that the term futile should be replaced
with “potentially inappropriate” to refer to medical care that has some chance
of clinical success but that, for ethical reasons, clinicians feel should not be
provided.
See
Gabriel
T.
Bosslet
et
al.,
An
Official
ATS/AACN/ACCP/ESICM/SCCM Policy Statement: Responding to
Requests for Potentially Inappropriate Treatments in Intensive Care Units,
191 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1318, 1319 (2015).
52. See infra notes 53 to 90 and accompanying text.
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commentators have observed, informed consent law fails to
guarantee that patients actually comprehend their end-of-life
care options. To increase the chances that patients will be able
to give (or withhold) truly informed consent to life-prolonging
therapies and technologies, physicians, bioethicists, and others
have promoted the practice of shared decision making and the
use of decision aids, among other methods. In the next parts of
the paper, we will comment on these techniques in the context
of how doctors and patients interact with each other and within
our health care system.
As we will explain in the last section of the paper, informed
consent law, shared decision making, and decision aids can
help to improve the quality of end-of-life decisions by any
measure, but they do not guarantee the authenticity of end-oflife choices.53 Authenticity is an ideal that goes beyond
informed consent. Authentic end-of-life choices are not just
informed in the sense of being based on accurate
understanding of risks and benefits of treatment; they also
reflect the individual’s willingness to acknowledge his or her
approaching death and to consider treatment and lifeprolonging measures in the broader context of his or her life
and values. In this respect, authentic decision making most
fully promotes the ethical value of individual autonomy at the
time in life when it matters most.
II. End of Life Decision Making:
The Limits of Informed Consent
This section will provide a brief overview of end-of-life law
in the United States, beginning with some background on
patient decision making, surrogate decision making, and the
ethical values of autonomy and best interests. It will then
53. See, e.g., Insoo Hyun, Waiver of Informed Consent, Cultural
Sensitivity, and the Problem of Unjust Families and Traditions, 32 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 14, 15 (2002) (describing the role of authentic values in the ideal of
personal autonomy and arguing that informed consent or the waiver of
consent must rest on patient values that are “free of coercive formative
influences.”); see also Daniel Brudney, Choosing for Another: Beyond
Autonomy and Best Interests, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 31-32 (2009)
(describing authenticity as “the capacity to be a particular self, a distinctive
individual . . .”).
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describe the legal doctrine of informed consent and its limited
effectiveness in achieving its goals, due in part to patients’
limited ability to understand and process complex and
inherently incomplete medical information.
Finally, the
section will introduce the concept of shared decision making
and the role of decision aids in promoting patient
understanding and informed decisions about end-of-life care.
These techniques can help to ameliorate, but cannot by
themselves entirely solve, the problem of overutilization of care
at the end of life.
A.

Patient and Surrogate Decision Making54

In the United States, according to both law and ethical
principles, medical care should accord with the individual
patient’s wishes. Patient autonomy (also sometimes referred to
as the principle of self-determination), as implemented in law
via the doctrines of informed consent and substituted
judgment, is the primary principle that governs medical
decisions, including those made on behalf of patients who have
lost decisional capacity.55 In ideal circumstances, patients can
express their preferences directly to their physicians at the
appropriate time. When a patient retains decisional capacity,
the patient’s choice may be irrational, unreasonable, or unwise,
but the doctrine of autonomy, with limited exceptions, protects
these choices. If, however, the patient has lost decisional
capacity, physicians must attempt to ascertain the patient’s
54. Much of this background discussion on U.S. end of life law is derived
from Barbara A. Noah, A Better Death in Britain?, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 868,
870-915 (2015).
55. See Alan Meisel, End-of-Life Care, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 51, 51-52 (Mary Crowley ed.,
2008) (“Autonomy is paramount for patients who possess decision making
capacity, but it is also a major consideration for patients who lack this
capacity. Their wishes must be respected by the relatives or other health
care proxies who make decisions on their behalf.”). The American Medical
Association (AMA) has acknowledged that patients have a right of selfdetermination that includes the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment,
and that this right is not lost when a patient loses decisional capacity. See
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Decisions Near the End of Life,
267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2229, 2229-33 (1992).
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preferences through a process known as substituted judgment,
using information from advance directives, conversations with
family members or proxy decision makers, and the context of
the patient’s values to guide patient care. Under this approach
of patient-directed care supplemented with substituted
judgment, the goal is to preserve the patient’s autonomy even
when he or she can no longer articulate a preference.
For patients who lose decisional capacity, an autonomybased model of medical decision making does not work well
unless the patients were previously willing to discuss their
preferences in advance and, ideally, to document them in some
form of advance directive. Unfortunately, this does not happen
as often as it should. A recent survey conducted in California
indicated that, while 80 percent of those surveyed believed that
it was important to record their end-of-life wishes in an
advance directive, less than a quarter of them had actually
done so.56 Only 42 percent of those surveyed indicated that
they had talked with a loved one about their end-of-life wishes,
and only seven percent had discussed their wishes with their
physicians.57 More recent sources indicate similarly low rates
of advance directive completion.58
56. See CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, FINAL CHAPTER:
CALIFORNIANS' ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES WITH DEATH AND DYING (Feb.
2012),
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/PDF%20F/P
DF%20FinalChapterDeathDying.pdf (surveying 1700 adults in California).
57. See id.
58. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-95-135, PATIENT SELFDETERMINATION ACT: PROVIDERS OFFER INFO. ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT
EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 2 (1995) (concluding that “advance directives have
been advocated more than they have been used” and that “in general, only 10
to 25 percent of Americans have documented their end-of-life choices or
appointed a health care agent”); Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider,
Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 32, 36
(2004) (noting that less than 20 percent of Americans having living wills and
that studies also suggest that living wills rarely influence the level of medical
care—in fact at least a quarter of patients with living wills receive care that
is inconsistent with their instructions). The most recent data suggest a slight
uptick in the percentage of Americans who have completed advance
directives. See Jaya K. Rao et al., Completion of Advance Directives Among
U.S. Consumers, 46 AM. J. PREV. MED. 65, 65-67 (2014) (finding, based on
survey data from 2009-2010, that 26.3% of respondents had completed an
advance directive and that older age, higher income, and higher educational
attainment were correlated with a higher likelihood of having an advance
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The law governing medical treatment and decision
making, including end-of-life decision making, is mostly left to
the states.59 Each of the 50 states has its own statutory and
common law addressing health care decision making, and this
fragmented system of regulation leads, not surprisingly, to
inconsistent standards, procedures, and results in the decision
making process.60 Thus, while all 50 states have incorporated
the autonomy principle into their individual laws by
acknowledging the authority of advance directives and formally
appointed health care proxies,61 standards of proof for
withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment vary by
state and by medical context, and some states restrict the
circumstances under which advance directives can be used to
withdraw or withhold some types of care.62
directive).
59. One notable exception, the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA),
represents a federal effort to encourage the completion of advance directives,
with very limited effectiveness. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO95-135, PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT: PROVIDERS OFFER INFO. ON
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 1 (1995); see also
Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 58, at 30, 32 (commenting on the empirical
studies that demonstrate the PSDA’s lack of effectiveness).
60. For more detailed discussion on the United States end of life law, see
generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW
OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING (3d., Aspen Publishers 2004); Noah, supra
note 2, at 249-52 (describing varying standards of evidence for purposes of
allowing a surrogate decision-maker to refuse treatment on behalf of an
incapacitated patient).
61. See Alan Meisel, End-of-Life Care, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 51, 51-52 (Mary Crowley ed.,
2008).
62. See Stephen Arons, Current Legal Issues in End-of-Life Care in
LIVING WITH DYING: A HANDBOOK FOR END-OF-LIFE HEALTHCARE
PRACTITIONERS 730, 733-36 (Phyllis R. Silverman & Joan Berzoff eds., 2004)
(explaining, for example, that some state statutes restrict which treatments
one can forego via an advance directive or at the direction of a proxy, such as
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, and some states do not
include permanent unconsciousness as a condition which can trigger the
provisions of an advance directive). About one-third of states exclude
permanent unconsciousness as a condition for which advance directives can
be used to withhold or withdraw care and at least three-quarters of states
permit individual health care providers to refuse to carry out patient wishes,
for reasons of conscience or for no reason at all. See id. at 730, 734. Many of
the state statutes that restrict the use of advance directives to particular
types of medical situations potentially raise constitutional questions and
might be challenged on this basis.
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Despite this heavy emphasis on the principle of autonomy,
American law also includes references to, and consideration of,
the principle of the patient’s best interests. In some cases, an
analysis based on the patient’s best interests can lead to the
rejection of life-prolonging treatment that might otherwise be
continued, on the basis that the treatment in question does not
confer a benefit to the patient by improving quality of life.
Many states’ laws already acknowledge a place for best
interests analysis in making treatment decisions for
incapacitated patients.63 For example, courts have recognized
the concept of “proportionate treatment,” and have suggested
that “a treatment course which is only minimally painful or
intrusive may nonetheless be considered disproportionate to
the potential benefits if the prognosis is virtually hopeless for
any significant improvement in condition.”64 In one New York
decision, the court refused to authorize life-prolonging
treatment for an incapacitated adult who had suffered several
strokes and had very little cognitive ability, holding that
incapacitated patients retain their right to refuse lifesustaining treatment and that the surgery would at best
prolong the dying process while providing “no human or
humane benefit” to her.65 And in a well-regarded New Jersey
decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court envisioned a sliding
63. For example, New York permits an appointed health care agent to
make a decision, in the absence of information about the patient’s wishes, to
withdraw care in accordance with the patient’s best interests, but it contains
an express exception for artificial nutrition and hydration. Only if the
patient has specifically spoken on this matter may the health care agent
request the withdrawal of this type of life-sustaining medical technology. See
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW art. 29-C § 2982(4) (McKinney 2014). State law in
Massachusetts instructs health care proxies to make decisions for
incapacitated patients based on what the patient would choose but, if this is
unknown, instructs the proxy to decide what is in the patient’s best interests.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 5 (1997) (“After consultation with health
care providers, and after full consideration of acceptable medical alternatives
regarding diagnosis, prognosis, treatments and their side effects, the agent
shall make health care decisions: (i) in accordance with the agent’s
assessment of the principal’s wishes, including the principal’s religious and
moral beliefs, or (ii) if the principal’s wishes are unknown, in accordance with
the agent’s assessment of the principal’s best interests.”).
64. Barber v. Superior Ct., 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Ct. App. 1983)
(permitting withdrawal of treatment from a comatose patient).
65. In re Beth Israel Med. Ctr. for Weinstein, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513-14,
18 (Super. Ct. 1987).

25

762

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:3

scale from pure autonomy-based decision making to pure best
interests-based decision making, depending on the quality and
quantity of available evidence of the patient’s wishes.66
Often, however, when a patient loses decisional capacity,
insufficient evidence of the patient’s wishes will leave
physicians and family members in a quandary as to whether to
continue providing therapeutic treatment or life-sustaining
care. Uncertainty about prognosis in the case of terminal
illness and the possibility of some recovery of function in the
case of severe brain injury add to the complexity of decisions
about withdrawing treatment or life-supportive measures.
Occasional references to best interests analysis aside,
American law generally favors continued life supportive
measures when the patient’s wishes are in dispute or unknown.
As the Schiavo litigation and other cases of its type illustrate,
many individuals, with the backing of courts, take the position
that end-of-life laws should default to continued treatment
whenever a patient’s choice or best interests are in dispute,
without regard to any assessment of the patient’s quality of
life.67

66. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (N.J. 1985) (explaining that
under a “limited-objective test,” life-sustaining treatments may be withdrawn
or withheld when there is some reliable evidence that the patient would wish
it and when it is clear that the burdens of continued life with treatment
outweigh the benefits and that under a “pure-objective test,” treatment
similarly may be withdrawn or withheld in cases where the “net burdens of
the patient’s life with the treatment . . . clearly and markedly outweigh the
benefits that the patient derives from life” even where there is no evidence of
the patient’s preferences).
67. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281
(1990) (“[A] state may properly decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’
of life that a particular person may enjoy and simply assert an unqualified
interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the
constitutionally protected interests of the individual.”); Conservatorship of
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 174 (Cal. 2001) (upholding a trial court decision to
continue life-sustaining treatment despite a proxy decision-maker’s request
to withdraw it because the proxy “offered no basis for such a finding other
than her own subjective judgment that the conservatee did not enjoy a
satisfactory quality of life and legally insufficient evidence to the effect that
he would have wished to die”); In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Prob. Ct.
Hennepin Co., Minn., June 28, 1991) (upholding the surrogate’s request for
continued treatment of the patient, who was in a persistent vegetative state
and who died more than a year later of sepsis).
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B. Informed Consent Law and Its Role in End-of-Life
Decisions
Ideally, patients’ decisions would always reflect the
principle of autonomy because they are governed by the law of
informed consent. Informed consent is ethically and legally
required for all medical procedures and treatment
relationships. As explained in the Nuremberg Code, ethically
valid consent requires adequate information, freedom of choice,
and the capacity to make the decision in question.68 As to the
information disclosed, in general, informed consent requires a
discussion of the risks,69 benefits, and alternatives to the
proposed medical intervention, including the option of doing
nothing, or withholding or withdrawing care.70 The protection
of the autonomy principle that informed consent law provides
68. See
The
Nuremberg
Code,
HHS
(Nov.
7,
2005),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nurcode.html
(describing
“voluntary
consent” as meaning that “that the person involved should have legal
capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free
power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion;
and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of
the subject matter involved, as to enable him to make an understanding and
enlightened decision.”). For a careful analysis of decisional capacity and its
elements see Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Competence, Capacity, and Informed
Consent: Beyond the Cognitive-Competence Model, 24 CAN. J. ON AGING 295,
297 (2005) (distinguishing between competence and capacity in the context of
informed consent and suggesting that valid consent requires more than
simply the cognitive ability to process the relevant information); see also Paul
S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment,
357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1834-35 (2007) (describing the requirement of
decisional capacity (or competence) for valid informed consent to treatment).
69. As commentators on medical consent have explained, “The
magnitude of the risks and their frequency should receive special emphasis.
Also considered are alternative treatments and their benefits, risks, and
measured utility, the likely results of no treatment; and the probability of a
good outcome with the proposed strategy.” See Timothy J. Paterick et al.,
Medical Informed Consent: General Considerations for Physicians, 83 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 313, 316 (2008).
70. See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 3-11 (3d ed.
2015) (explaining that factors to be disclosed include diagnosis, nature and
purpose of treatment, risks of treatment and, in some circumstances
comparative data on the treating physician’s skills, alternatives to the
proposed treatment, prognosis with and without the treatment, and conflicts
of interest).
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is, however, only as good as the quality and accuracy of the
information on which the consent is based and the individual
decision maker’s ability to comprehend and process that
information.
The scope of required disclosure varies by
jurisdiction, but typically follows one of two models, with states
about evenly divided between the two.71 In states that have
adopted the professional standard of disclosure, physicians
must disclose all information that a reasonable physician
would disclose under the circumstances.72 In jurisdictions that
follow the patient-oriented standard, the physician must
disclose what a reasonable patient would want to know under
the circumstances.73
71. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LAW AND HEALTH CARE QUALITY,
PATIENT SAFETY, AND MEDICAL LIABILITY 195 (7th ed. 2013).
72. See, e.g., Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772, 777 (Va. 2002)
(explaining that “[a] physician has a duty in the exercise of ordinary care to
inform a patient of the dangers of, possible negative consequences of, and
alternatives to a proposed medical treatment or procedure. To recover against
a physician for failure to provide such information, the patient generally is
required to establish by expert testimony whether and to what extent any
information should have been disclosed.”); see also FURROW ET AL. , supra note
70, at § 3-10(a) (describing the physician-based standard of disclosure).
73. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 70,
at § 3-10(b) (describing the reasonable patient standard of disclosure). As the
Canterbury opinion explains, disclosure should include a number of elements:
The cases demonstrate that the physician is under an
obligation to communicate specific information to the
patient when the exigencies of reasonable care call for it.
Due care may require a physician perceiving symptoms of
bodily abnormality to alert the patient to the condition. It
may call upon the physician confronting an ailment that
does not respond to his ministrations to inform the patient
thereof. It may command the physician to instruct the
patient as to any limitations to be presently observed for his
own welfare, and as to any precautionary therapy he should
seek in the future. It may oblige the physician to advise the
patient of the need for or desirability of any alternative
treatment promising greater benefit than that being
pursued. Just as plainly, due care normally demands that
the physician warn the patient of any risks to his well-being
which contemplated therapy may involve.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. Although the two standards have varying
effects on the plaintiff’s burden of proof, these effects are not relevant for
purposes of this discussion. It is also worth noting that documentation of
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When a patient is asked to make an informed decision to
consent to, say, a surgical procedure to remove his gall bladder,
the physician will describe the purpose of the surgery, its risks
and benefits, and alternatives to the procedure, if any, and the
patient then will sign a consent form indicating a willingness to
undergo the surgery. In the context of decisions about whether
to provide life-prolonging care to a dying patient, however, the
consent process becomes more complicated. When a dying
patient has not expressed any preferences about life-prolonging
technology and has lost decisional capacity, the decision
defaults to a proxy or family member who may, for various
reasons, hesitate to refuse proffered life-prolonging care.74 In
these cases, the proxy or surrogate decision maker may agree
to, for example, intubation or artificial nutrition and hydration,
and may sign a consent form after receiving information about
the purpose, risks, and benefits of these interventions—not
because the surrogate believes that this is what the patient
would want, but rather because feelings of grief, guilt, or other
emotions make it more difficult to refuse life-prolonging
treatment on behalf of a loved one than to consent to it. The
surrogate thus provides legally valid consent, but based on a
potentially misplaced understanding of what is in the patient’s
best interests rather than on what the patient, if able, would
choose.75 Thus, the operation of the usual consent process
informed consent via the patient’s or surrogate’s signature on a form simply
memorializes the prior consent discussion between physician and patient—
the signed form itself does not constitute “informed consent.” Id. at 780 n. 15.
74. It is important to note that the role of surrogate and proxy decision
makers is not limited to making decisions for dying patients. Proxies and
surrogates are asked to make medical decisions in any context (including
non-terminal situations) in which the patient has lost decisional capacity.
75. There are also good arguments for considering the potential
motivations of legally appointed health care proxies differently from the
motivations of surrogates who assume the role because they are the first
available person in the hierarchy of decision-making. In the case of proxies
who have been duly appointed by the now-incapacitated patient, there is
arguably more cause for confidence that the proxy will decide based on the
patient’s wishes, particularly if the patient has instructed the proxy as to his
wishes. The very fact of the appointment suggests that the patient has
placed his trust in the proxy. In contrast, we might be less inclined to trust
the instructions of a person who serves as a surrogate based on a state
statutory hierarchy of surrogate decision-making to reflect a decision based
on the patient’s choice rather than on the surrogate’s assessment of the
patient’s best interests. In any event, recent evidence suggests that, even
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means that, for patients who do not clearly opt out of lifeprolonging treatment before losing decisional capacity, the path
of least resistance can lead to decisions in favor of initiating or
continuing life-prolonging care. As explained above, courts
have endorsed this default path by ruling in favor of continuing
life-prolonging care in cases of uncertainty about the patient’s
preference.76 Physicians can, of course, simply decline to
discuss and proffer life-prolonging options for dying patients
where they think it clinically inappropriate, but, as the
discussion in Part I illustrates, the current reality of end-of-life
care makes this challenging.
The law sends conflicting signals to physicians regarding
the management of patient care at the end of life. On the one
hand, physicians do have an ethical and legal obligation to
avoid providing treatments that are harmful to patients or are
inconsistent with their wishes. Courts have recognized this
obligation and have awarded damages against physicians and
institutions for providing treatment contrary to patients’
wishes.77 Conversely, many state statutes insulate physicians
from liability for patient deaths that result from withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment as requested by a patient’s advance
directive.78 On the other hand, despite this apparent protection
when patients appoint a health care proxy, there is little change in the
utilization of end-of-life treatment. See Amol K. Narang et al., Trends in
Advance Care Planning in Patients With Cancer: Results from a National
Longitudinal Survey, 1 J. AM. MED. ASS'N E5-E6 (2015) (finding that
assignment of proxies or durable powers of attorney for health care was not
associated with decisions to limit aggressive care at the end of life).
76. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984) (recognizing a civil cause of action for wrongful continuation of life
supportive measures); but see Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc.,
671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996) (rejecting a “wrongful living” claim based on
hospital’s resuscitation of patient after he had requested a succeeded in
having a “no code blue” order placed in his chart and holding that “continued
living” is not a compensable injury); see also Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699
N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to recognize a battery claim for
intubation and ventilation of a dying patient contrary to his advance directive
and the statements of his health care proxy and citing Anderson with
approval and critiquing the court’s decision in Leach).
78. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.109 (2015) (“A health care facility,
provider, or other person who acts under the direction of a health care facility
or provider is not subject to criminal prosecution or civil liability, and will not
be deemed to have engaged in unprofessional conduct, as a result of carrying
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of patient autonomy when the patient has expressed a
preference, many states have enacted conscience clause
legislation, which allows a physician to transfer the care of a
patient when compliance with that person’s advance directive
would conflict with the physician’s conscience.79 In addition,
case law suggests that many states adopt a position of erring
on the side of continued treatment in cases of uncertainty or
disagreement about the patient’s choice.80
This state of affairs which, as we have seen, often results
in overutilization of care at the end of life, may seem to follow
from the autonomy principle, but in fact it results from a
stunted or overly mechanistic view of the physician’s role in
guiding end-of-life decision making. Physicians are rarely
called upon to make the actual decision about whether to
withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment, and even if the
patient or surrogate requests that the physician decide, the
physician has an ethical obligation to do so based on an
understanding of the particular patient’s values and goals of
out a health care decision made in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:12(II)(a) (2015) (“No health care
provider . . . shall be subjected to civil or criminal liability or be deemed to
have engaged in unprofessional conduct for . . . [a]ny act or intentional
failure to act, if . . . done pursuant to the dictates of an advance directive . . .
.”).
79. See A.B.A. Myths and Facts About Health Care Advance Directives,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Commissions/myths_f
act_hc_ad.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited March 28, 2016); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 137-J:7(I)(D) (“If a physician . . . because of his or her personal beliefs
or conscience, is unable to comply with the terms of the advance directive or
surrogate's decision, he or she shall immediately inform the qualified patient,
the qualified patient's family, or the qualified patient's agent. The qualified
patient, or the qualified patient's agent or family, may then request that the
case be referred to another physician . . . .”); see also FURROW ET AL., supra
note 70, at § 16-21 (discussing statutory protections from liability for
compliance with advance directives and statutory inclusion of conscience
clauses). Nevertheless, some commentators have advocated for the legal
enforcement of these documents. See generally Andrew J. Broder, She Don’t
Want No Life Support: A Summary of Osgood and Other Developments in
Michigan Since Martin, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 595-605 (1998); NORMAN L.
CANTOR, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF DEATH WITH DIGNITY 13034 (Indiana University Press 1993); Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead than
Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a "Wrongful Living" Cause of Action
When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients' Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 149 (1997).
80. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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care.81 Physicians instead usually are asked to implement
decisions made by patients (directly or via advance directives)
or their proxies. Because the autonomy principle focuses on
the patient’s preferences, the physician can, if he or she
chooses, avoid the more complex discussion of whether
continuing treatment serves the patient’s best interests as a
medical matter, even if the patient consents to that treatment.
As commentators have observed:
Responsibility for medical care has landed on the
shoulders of patients with a resounding thud.
Patients have the choice of telling physicians
what to do in relation to health care decisions.
The tone of medical practice has shifted from
paternalistic to consultative, in which the
physician lays the possibilities before the patient,
with the potential pluses and minuses of each,
and the patient makes a choice.82
Under most circumstances, if a patient or surrogate requests
continued treatment or life-prolonging interventions, the
physician can simply acquiesce (assuming the requested
intervention is not futile as a scientific matter). But where the
requested intervention is arguably not in the patient’s best
interests, mere acquiescence debases the physician’s role.
Because the physician is responsible for the patient’s wellbeing, the physician has an ethical and legal obligation to help
the patient or surrogate decision maker understand the risks,
potential outcomes, and alternatives associated with the
requested intervention, not just its purpose. In some

81. For an interesting case study of a situation in which the patient
delegated the decision about whether to have CABG surgery to his physician,
see Alan W. Cross & Larry R. Churchill, Ethical and Cultural Dimensions of
Informed Consent: A Case Study and Analysis, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
110, 110-12 (1982) (explaining that in this “paternalism with permission”
situation, consent is not invalidated but rather requires the physician to
“gain as complete an understanding as possible fo the patient’s values,
culture, and life-style . . . [to] appreciate the larger significance fo the
treatment choice for the patient.”).
82. See Paterick et al., supra note 69, at 318 (adding that “[w]hen it
comes to medical treatment, patients see choice as a burden and a blessing.”).
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circumstances physicians, while acknowledging that the
decision remains the patient’s, will have an ethical obligation
to opine as to what is in the patient’s best medical interests
and to discuss this opinion in the context of the patient’s
expressed wishes.83 Ideally, the goal is to help the patient or
surrogate make a decision that is consistent with the patient’s
goals of care as well as the patient’s broader values,
preferences, and beliefs, so that the decision is truly informed,
as both the law and the ethical principle of autonomy require.
This is no easy task. To start, these discussions often
occur at the point of decision rather than in advance, leaving
little time for reflection. The presence of relatives may
heighten emotions or tensions, particularly if the relatives
disagree with the patient’s or surrogate’s choices. In addition
to being emotionally challenging, decisions about whether and
when to cease curative care and whether to begin or to
withdraw life-prolonging technology are inherently complex as
a scientific matter. Physicians and patients want to make the
“best” choices about medical care for terminal illness but
obviously lack the omniscience needed to calculate future
possibilities without error. The ability of physicians and
patients to make rational calculations about the comparative
desirability of various options is limited not only by the
imperfections of predictive data on therapeutic response,
adverse effects, and prognosis, among other things, but also by
their limited abilities to process the available information
rationally.84 Although it is impossible to eliminate uncertainty
about treatment decisions, physicians can provide more
guidance and more accurate information about the relative
merits of various options for individual patients than they
83. The ethical principle of beneficence, which operates alongside the
primary principle of autonomy, requires that physicians which requires that
physicians provide that care which is in their patients’ best medical interests.
See JOHN C. FLETCHER ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL ETHICS 12 (2d ed.
1997) (describing beneficence as the “obligation to benefit patients . . . and to
further their welfare and interests”).
84. Cf. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.
J. ECON. 99-118 (1955) (describing the limitations of individuals to process
information due to limited data and limitations of intellectual calculative
abilities as “bounded rationality”); see generally JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW
DOCTORS THINK (Houghton Mifflin Comp. 2007) (discussing clinical
uncertainty in diagnosis and treatment recommendations).
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typically do now. And, as explained above, what constitutes
“best” for a patient will vary depending on whether the patient
evaluates quality based on the likely effectiveness of the care in
achieving its medical goals or on how the care comports with
the patient’s own values.
It is important to avoid shortcuts in these conversations.
For example, statistical life expectancy values based on past
experience with similar populations provide a snapshot of
population trends, but it is difficult to assess their relevance to
any particular patient’s situation. There is often no way to
predict whether a particular patient will, on the one hand,
outlive the statistical projection for life expectancy or, on the
other hand, die much sooner than the average.85 Similarly,
prognosis for meaningful recovery in many medical
circumstances, such as for stroke patients, requires a
discussion between physician and patient of complex variables
such as the likelihood that the patient will regain various
degrees of physical function.86
And these conversations are not simply about prognosis.
Physicians also must recognize that patients frequently fail to
understand the likely curative value of certain invasive
treatments, either because this information is not included in
the discussion or because it is impossible to predict with any
85. See George A. Diamond, Future Imperfect: The Limitations of
Clinical Prediction Models and the Limits of Clinical Prediction, 14 J. AM.
COLL. OF CARDIOLOGY A12, A12-22 (1989) (describing different ways in which
statistical regressive models to predict clinical outcomes can go awry).
Courts also have recognized the limitations of statistical prognoses in the
context of defining boundaries of informed consent. See, e.g., Arato v.
Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993) (“[S]tatistical life expectancy data had little
predictive value when applied to a particular patient with individualized
symptoms, medical history, character traits, and other variables.”).
86. A meta-analysis of data from multiple studies on the recovery of
stroke patients who were receiving mechanical ventilation found that
prognosis was generally poor, with 58% of these patients dying within 30
days, but that a minority of patients survived without severe disability. See
Robert G. Holloway et al., Prognosis and Decision Making in Severe Stroke,
294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 725, 727-28 & tbl. 1 (2005). The authors of this study
caution that physicians can be unrealistically optimistic or pessimistic in
various circumstances and that physicians should think carefully about how
they convey prognostic evidence. See id. at 729 & tbl. 3 (offering the example
of a surgical intervention giving a person “a 50% chance at a better outcome”
versus that same intervention increasing the person’s chance “of improved
outcome from 5% to 7.5%”).
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accuracy the effects of the treatment on a particular patient.
With respect to chemotherapy for metastatic cancer, one study
found that 69% of patients with lung cancer and 81% of
patients with colorectal cancer mistakenly believed that the
chemotherapy they were receiving was likely to cure their
disease.87 The problem with this unrealistic expectation of cure
is that patients will be more likely to consent to treatment that,
while it may palliate symptoms or even extend life, is also
likely to cause significant toxic effects that will impair quality
of life. Patients who understand that chemotherapy under
these circumstances cannot cure their illness and will at best
have a palliative effect on it may weigh the value of this
treatment differently and may be more likely to decline it. The
conversation between physician and patient that is needed to
evaluate the patient’s level of understanding in these
circumstances is likely to be as challenging as any conversation
about poor prognosis.
Simply presenting patients with statistics about likely
prognoses and side effects of various treatment options is a
poor substitute for the broader responsibility to the patient to
discuss the reality of the patient’s particular situation (as far
as it can be known) and the available options. The challenge
for physicians is to present information that will allow patients
and families to make informed decisions and to guide those
decisions with the physician’s expert judgment about the best
course of action without overwhelming patients with unwanted
or confusing data.88 Of course, some physicians will resist such
conversations, either because of their personal moral or
religious views or because they find this sort of communication
too difficult.
In sum, the process and substance that constitutes
87. See Jane C. Weeks et al., Patients’ Expectations About Effects of
Chemotherapy for Advanced Cancer, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1616, 1619 (2012)
(noting that, “[p]aradoxically, patients who reported higher scores for
physician communication were also at higher risk for inaccurate
expectations” regarding the curative potential of chemotherapy).
88. See C. Alifrangis et al., The Experiences of Cancer Patients, 104 Q. J.
MED. 1075, 1079-80 (2011) (emphasizing the need for physicians to take the
lead and ask what individual patients would like to know before providing
detailed information about prognosis, efficacy of proposed therapy and
related matters).
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“informed consent” satisfies physicians’ and health care
institutions’ legal obligations: If the patient receives
comprehensible information about the relevant decision
through an appropriate process and then makes a choice, the
physician and institution are insulated from liability for
providing (or withholding) continued therapy or life-prolonging
medical treatment. But mere compliance with legal informed
consent requirements does not ensure that patients’ end of life
choices are truly informed; as a consequence, many patients
continue to receive care in excess of what they would have
chosen had they fully understood their options and more
thoroughly considered, together with their physicians and
family members, how those options comport with their values.
Two relatively recent developments in the clinical decision
making process seek to address some of the limitations of
relying solely on the mechanics of informed consent doctrine.
The first is shared decision making (SDM).89 The SDM model
recognizes
and
respects
patient
autonomy
while
simultaneously acknowledging the physician’s responsibility
for the patient’s well-being.90 It represents an effort to include
the patient more actively in the process of making complex
medical choices, including choices about end-of-life care.91
Rather than viewing informed consent as a rigid two-step
process in which the physician provides information and the
patient then makes a decision—a burdensome model for many
89. See, e.g., Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New
Health
System
for
the
21st
Century
(2001),
https://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2001/Crossing-theQuality-Chasm/Quality%20Chasm%202001%20%20report%20brief.pdf
(advocating shared decision-making in the form of emphasis on the patient’s
values and beliefs and encouraging the open exchange of information
between physician and patient); see also Cathy Charles et al., Shared
Decision-Making in the Medical Encounter: What Does It Mean? (or It takes at
Least Two to Tango), 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 681 (1997) (advocating improved
clarity as to what is meant by the term “shared decision making”); Jaime
Staples King & Benjamin Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case
for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429 (2006).
90. Alan Meisel & Mark Kuczewski, Legal and Ethical Myths About
Informed Consent, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2521, 2522 (1996).
91. See Chuck Alston, et al., Shared Decision-Making Strategies for Best
Care:
Patient
Decision
Aids
NAT’L
ACAD.
OF
MED.
(2014),
http://nam.edu/perspectives-2014-shared-decision-making-strategies-for-bestcare-patient-decision-aids/.
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patients, as suggested above—SDM “does not restrict the
physician to providing the facts and insist[] that the patient
supply all the values. The physician and the patient each have
access to interrelated facts and values.”92
As part of or in addition to SDM, decision aids can play an
important role in helping patients comprehend complex
medical information more easily.93 Decision aids come in
multiple forms, including videos and interactive computer
programs.94 Decision aids have been around for some time, but
appear to be proliferating as information technology advances
and becomes more widely accessible. They have multiple goals,
including explaining patients’ options and the risks and
benefits of various choices in accessible, jargon-free language,
helping patients to articulate the goals or outcomes that are
most important to them, and guiding patients through the
steps to making choices consistent with their values.95
Decision aids are particularly useful in assisting patients to
make decisions about “preference-sensitive” medical care—care
for medical situations in which multiple reasonable options
exist96 and the goal is to help patients make a choice that
92. See Meisel & Kuczewski, supra note 90, at 2522; see also Michael J.
Barry & Susan Edgman-Levitan, Shared Decision Making—The Pinnacle of
Patient-Centered Care, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 780, 781 (2012) (explaining
that, in shared decision making, “both parties share information: the
clinician offers options and describes their risks and benefits, and the patient
expresses his or her preferences and values. Each participant is thus armed
with a better understanding of the relevant factors and shares responsibility
in the decision about how to proceed.”).
93. See Annette M. O’Connor et al., Toward the ‘Tipping Point’: Decision
Aids and Informed Patient Choice, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 716, 717-18 (2007);
See also Jonathan Rauch, How Not to Die, THE ATLANTIC, May 2013, at 64-66
(profiling the efforts of Dr. Angelo Volandes, a professor at Harvard Medical
School, who makes brief but graphic informational videos to educate patients
about the rigors of interventions such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation and
mechanical ventilation).
94. For a selection of decision aids, see Decision Aids, DARTMOUTHHITCHCOCK,
http://www.dartmouth-hitchcock.org/medicalinformation/decision_aids.html.
95. See O’Connor, supra note 93, at 717.
96. See Barry & Edgman-Levitan, supra note 92, at 780 (explaining that,
for some medical conditions, “there is one clearly superior path, and patient
preferences play little or no role . . . For most medical decisions, however,
more than one reasonable path forward exists (including the option of doing
nothing, when appropriate), and different paths entail different combinations
. . . effects . . . . In such cases, patient involvement in decision making adds

37

774

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:3

comports with the patient’s own ideas of benefits and harms.97
For these reasons, decision aids appear well suited to assist
patients and surrogates with complex end-of- life decisions.
Both SDM and decision aids can help advance end-of-life
decision making beyond the bare requirements of informed
consent law, reducing excess treatment and leading to care
that more often comports with patients’ truly informed wishes.
Both SDM and decision aids add an extra dimension to the
decision making process and, if used properly, require
additional interaction between physician and patient. In this
respect, both developments can improve on the unfortunately
common practice of having only minimal discussions about endof-life planning or avoiding those discussions altogether. In the
next part of this paper, we pursue further how these
techniques can contribute to improved physician-patient
communication.
III. Improving Communication Between
Physicians and Patients
Informed consent is and will remain the legal standard for
medical decision making, including decisions at the end of life.
But the physician-patient relationship obviously consists of
more than the delivery of tests and treatments with the
patient’s “informed consent.” Unfortunately, physicians often
lack training “in recognizing and accepting the process of
dying, managing pain and other symptoms adequately, and
attending to the emotional needs of the dying and their
families.”98 Moving beyond this treatment-focused model to a
substantial value.”); Simon N. Whitney et al., A Typology of Shared Decision
Making, Informed Consent, and Simple Consent, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
54, 55-56 (2004) (observing that shared decision making makes the most
sense “only when real choice exists and the physician involves the patient in
the decision” and suggesting categories of consent and decision making and
zones of overlap between the two concepts).
97. See O’Connor et al., supra note 93, at 716; see also John E. Wennberg
& Philip G. Peters, Unwanted Variations in the Quality of Health Care: Can
the Law Help Medicine Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 925, 930-35 (2002).
98. See James R. Patterson & Marion O. Hodges, Letter to the Editor,
338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1389 (1998) (adding that “[i]t is sad that our care of the
dying has lagged behind other forms of medical care, justifying the fear of
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genuine relationship involving trust, truthfulness, and caring
for the patient as a person (rather than as a diagnosis) requires
that all parties be willing to talk openly about the dying
process and to share the burden of making decisions in a
context rife with ambivalence and emotion.
Given the
complexity of the information involved, informed consent in the
end-of-life context should be an ongoing conversation that
evolves as the situation progresses and gives the patient or
surrogate an opportunity to discuss care preferences as the
need arises. Although the current pattern of overutilization of
care at the end of life suggests that these conversations happen
less often and in less detail than they should, there are some
ways to encourage this sort of SDM process between physicians
and patients.
Before seeking informed consent for life-prolonging care,
physicians must first consider whether the proposed care is
potentially inappropriate or “futile.”99
Subjective futility
questions may lead to disagreement among health care
providers and patients and families about the appropriate
point to discontinue or withhold therapeutic or life-supportive
interventions.100 There is, however, unsettling evidence that
physicians knowingly provide treatments that they
conclusively believe to be futile for the patient.101 At least in
many persons that they will not be able to die with dignity and comfort. Our
emphasis must be on providing the necessary training.”).
99. For more detailed discussion of futility questions, see generally
Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1560, 1561 (1992); Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
985 (2009); Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Defining Medical Futility and
Improving Medical Care, 8 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 123, 123-31 (2011).
100. See supra notes 99 – 102 and accompanying text (discussing cases
in which futility disputes required judicial resolution).
101. See Huynh, supra note 11, at E3-E6 (finding, in a survey of
clinicians caring for critically ill patients, that while 80% of the patients were
not thought to be receiving futile treatment, 8.6% were perceived as receiving
probably futile treatment and 11% were thought to be receiving treatment
that was definitely futile). Not only did the authors conclude that the costs of
this probably or definitely futile care were substantial, they also
acknowledged that “the burdens to patients, families, and clinicians also
deserve attention.” Id. at E7. The term “futile” has been much criticized in
recent years. Commentators now recommend using the term “potentially
inappropriate care” or “inappropriate care” in order better to capture the idea
of treatments that may have some chance off success but for which clinicians
worry that “the treatment is highly unlikely to be successful, is extremely
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these cases, the physician could choose to discuss the matter
with the patient or surrogate decision maker in order to
explain why the treatment is arguably medically inappropriate,
rather than simply providing the treatment and avoiding the
discussion and the possibility of conflict.102 In the case of
genuine disagreement over the appropriateness of a particular
treatment, the physician is placed in an even more difficult
situation.103 Without guidance about an individual patient’s
beliefs regarding continued life-supportive measures, it is
difficult to know when to cease providing support to a person
whose condition will not improve.
Conversations about end-of-life care feature yet another
layer of complexity. Although most patients want to know
whether their disease is curable and, if not, how long they can
expect to live,104 the autonomy principle and the law of
informed consent recognize the right of patients not to
participate in their medical decisions.105 While physicians have
expensive, or is intended to achieve a goal of controversial value.” See Bosslet
et al., supra note 51, at 1319, 1322-33.
102. We do not address here the separate question of whether physicians
should override patient and surrogate decisions in cases where the physician
believes continued treatment to be futile but the patient or surrogate
demands continued treatment. Other commentators have ably addressed
these issues. See, e.g., Eric Gampel, Does Professional Autonomy Protect
Medical Futility Judgments?, 20 BIOETHICS 92, 92-104 (2006). Instead, we
focus on the question of what physicians can and should do in response to
requests for medically inappropriate treatment.
103. For a detailed set of suggestions aimed at preventing and/or
resolving treatment conflicts via “proactive communication,” see Bosslet et
al., supra note 51, at 1320-24 (recommending a series of steps to resolve
disputes with surrogate decision makers including the use of experts in
mediation and negation, seeking a second medical opinion, seeking review by
a hospital ethics committee, offering the option of transferring the patient to
another institution, and informing surrogates of the possibility of judicial
review).
104. See, e.g., Alifrangis, supra note 88, at 1077-79 (concluding, based on
survey data, that only 66% of patients in the U.K. wanted to be given a
prognosis and 12% said that they would not want to be told that they had a
short time to live); Rebecca C. Hagerty et al., Communicating with Realism
and Hope: Incurable Cancer Patients’ Views on the Disclosure of Prognosis, 23
J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY. 1278 (2005) (finding that 98% of Australian patients
surveyed preferred to receive realistic information about prognosis); Belinda
E. Kiely et al., Thinking and Talking About Life Expectancy in Incurable
Cancer, 38 SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY 380 (2011).
105. The U.S. law of informed consent and the ethical principle of selfdetermination on which it is based allow patients to reject information as
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no ethical or legal obligation to force patients to engage in these
discussions, this does not provide an excuse to sidestep the
conversation altogether. In situations where the patient has
not specifically declined to discuss his or her medical situation,
the physician must be more proactive in initiating discussions
about end of life care.
Better training in communication with patients and
families can help physicians become more skilled in initiating
and having these very challenging discussions. Institutional or
organizational guidelines can help to promote best practices,
including SDM. In addition, the use of decision aids can
provide a basis for patients and physicians to discuss the
advisability of particular interventions and can improve
patients’ comprehension of and active participation in complex
medical decisions. The POLST paradigm, also described below,
offers another promising framework for discussion between
physicians and terminally ill patients. There are limitations to
all of these interventions, but all can improve the quality of
medical decision making, whether gauged objectively in terms
of outcomes, or subjectively, in terms of patient preferences.
A.

Physician Training to Improve Communication

Better physician training regarding communication about
prognosis, treatment options, withdrawal and withholding of
life-sustaining care, and palliative and hospice care is sorely
needed.106 In order to change the habits and practices of
well as to receive it. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (describing an exception to the rule of informed consent in
circumstances where “risk-disclosure poses such a threat of detriment to the
patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of
view”). This “therapeutic privilege” not to disclose certainly would provide
support to a physician who chooses not to discuss prognosis and end of life
choices with a patient who declines to have the discussion; see also Meisel &
Kuczewski, supra note 90, at 2525 (“Withholding information from patients
when they request that it not be given respects their autonomy as much as
providing information to patients who want it . . . . Withholding information
from patients at their request is a legally recognized exception to informed
consent referred to as a waiver.”).
106. See Neil J. Farber et al., Physicians’ Decisions to Withhold and
Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 560, 563
(2006) (noting that lack of training about the ethical and legal issues may
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physicians, education should begin in medical school. Young
physicians in training are frequently eager to discuss ethical
challenges and are open to debate about best practices.107
Identification and directed discussion of problems in end of life
care during clinical training, along with instructors who model
good communication with patients, can achieve incremental
change. And, of course, continuing medical education that
trains practicing physicians regarding best practices and the
need for frank communication with patients and families about
end-of-life choices can provide physicians with the tools to
initiate and conduct these conversations under challenging
circumstances.
For many physicians, these conversations feel daunting. A
number of excellent publications suggest specific approaches to
discussing end of life treatment, particularly topics such as
ceasing active therapy, the transition to hospice, and
withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatments.108
lead to dissent among physicians when patients request that care be withheld
or withdrawn).
107. We base this claim on one author’s own multi-year experience as
part of a team teaching “Ethical and Legal Issues in the Practice of Medicine”
at a large medical school. The course was offered in the first semester of the
second year and consisted of weekly one-hour lectures followed by one or
more hours of small group discussion, led by faculty, centering around how to
resolve a clinical ethics dispute in the context of law, ethics, and feasible
medical options. The students in these small groups debated the issues
avidly and often left the room continuing the discussion. They also were
frequently incredulous about the law’s limitations in dealing with complex
ethical dilemmas in health care.
108. There is a wealth of literature that proposes and discusses such
frameworks for these conversations. See, e.g., NANCY BERLINGER, ET AL., THE
HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES FOR DECISIONS ON LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
AND CARE NEAR THE END OF LIFE (2d ed. 2013); KATY BUTLER, KNOCKING ON
HEAVEN’S DOOR: THE PATH TO A BETTER WAY OF DEATH (2013); Jim deMaine &
Joi Murotani Dennett, Communicating with Patients and Families About
Difficult End of Life Decisions: A Guide for Medical Providers, 36 HAMLINE L.
REV. 299 (2013); R. M. Epstein et al., Communicating Evidence for
Participatory Decision Making, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2359, 2362 (2004)
(reviewing the literature to identify research that guides physicians in
communicating with their patients about end of life choices and
recommending five communication tasks to facilitate good discussion between
physician and patient); Dale G. Larson & Daniel R. Tobin, End-of-Life
Conversations: Evolving Practice and Theory, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1573,
1576-77 (2000) (urging that end of life conversations become a routine part of
health care and that advance care planning function as a key aspect of these
discussions); Quyen Ngo-Metzger et al., End-of-Life Care: Guidelines for
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Many guidelines for end-of-life conversation recommend that
physicians begin by asking the patient what he or she would
like to know about the illness and prognosis.109 For example,
the American Society of Clinical Oncology has published a “best
practices” model that recommends a series of conversations
with patients with terminal cancer diagnoses, with content to
reflect the patient’s evolving medical condition.110 One large
facility that implemented this best practices model found that
it doubled the length of patient participation in hospice care
and decreased total costs while maintaining survival rates.111
Curricula designed to teach physicians skills for
conversation with patients also are available. The American
Academy on Communication in Healthcare and the Association
for Behavioral Sciences in Medical Education are among
Patient-Centered Communication, 77 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 167 (2008);
Timothy E. Quill, Initiating End-of-Life Discussions With Seriously Ill
Patients: Addressing the “Elephant in the Room”, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2502,
2503-04 (2000) (providing a list of clinical indications for discussing end of life
care, including imminent death, talk about wanting to die, inquiries about
hospice, recent hospitalization for severe progressive illness, severe suffering,
questions about prognosis, discussing treatment with low probability of
success, discussing hopes and fears, and in cases where the physician would
not be surprised if the patient died within 6-12 months).
109. For example, one commentator advises that physicians ask what
the patient wants to know and then tell the truth in an understandable and
clear way about the time that the patient may have left and what he or she
can expect. See Thomas J. Smith & Dan L. Longo, Talking with Patients
About Dying, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1651 (2012). Another commentator
proposed a five step sequential approach to communication with dying
patients and their families, beginning with consent for an initial trial of
treatment, and addressing topics such as treatment failure, stopping
treatment, and requests for arguably futile treatment.
See Stephen
Workman, A Communication Model for Encouraging Optimal Care at the
End of Life for Hospitalized Patients, 100 Q. J. MED. 791, 792-94 (2007).
110. See Thomas J. Smith et al., American Society of Clinical Oncology
Provisional Clinical Opinion: The Integration of Palliative Care into
Standard Oncology Care, 20 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 880, 880 (2012) (“While a
survival benefit from early involvement of palliative care has not yet been
demonstrated in other oncology settings, substantial evidence demonstrates
that palliative care—when combined with standard cancer care or as the
main focus of care—leads to better patient and caregiver outcomes. These
include improvement in symptoms, QOL, and patient satisfaction, with
reduced caregiver burden. Earlier involvement of palliative care also leads to
more appropriate referral to and use of hospice, and reduced use of futile
intensive care.”).
111. Id. at 881-82.
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several organizations that have developed evidence-based
clinical teaching exercises designed to improve the physicianpatient encounter.112 Physicians and medical students who
complete these sorts of courses can learn to incorporate
empathy and listening skills into their relationships with
patients.113 These efforts should also reach beyond physicians
to other non-physician health care providers, as well as social
workers and related professionals. Again, some of this is
happening already, but making this type of training routine (or
even mandating it for certain specialties) may help to
accelerate change. And, if multiple members of a team or
department incorporate these values into their interactions
with patients and families, it will reinforce best practices and
model them for any providers who remain reluctant.
“How to” articles, guidelines, and courses provide a useful
tool for training, but still do not bridge the gap between theory
and practice. Physicians still may hesitate to take the lead.
Yet they have an ethical and clinical obligation to initiate these
discussions, even though the ultimate decision making
authority lies with the patient or surrogate decision maker.
Physicians may worry that discussing these matters with
patients will generate anxiety or may give the patient or family
the idea that the physician is abandoning care of the patient,114
112. See
A M.
ACAD.
ON
COMMC’N
IN
HEALTHCARE,
http://www.aachonline.org (last visited Mar. 28, 2016); ASS’N FOR THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIS. & MED. ED., http://www.absame.org/About-ABSAME (last
visited Mar. 28, 2016) (providing information and resources for medical
school and continuing medical education curricula).
113. See Daniel F. Duffy, Dialogue: The Core Clinical Skill, 128 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 139, 140 (1998) (discussing evidence suggesting that
physician traits such as empathy and listening improve the patient
treatment encounter).
114. Cf. Steven Z. Pantilat, Communicating With Seriously Ill Patients:
Better Words to Say, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1279, 1279 (2009) (explaining that
recent research on physician-patient communication emphasizes the value of
a model that involves multiple conversations over time and that offers the
prospect of continued care, even if active therapy to cure the disease no
longer makes sense); Quill, supra note 108, at 2503 (“Timely, sensitive
discussions with seriously ill patients regarding medical, psychosocial, and
spiritual needs at the end of life are both an obligation of and privilege for
every physician.”); Larson & Tobin, supra note 108, at 1575 (“[D]iscussing
palliative care issues while disease-remitting treatments are continued
without creating a perception of abandonment requires the utmost empathy
and skill.”).
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but they need to recognize the importance of these
conversations and to proceed, gently.
Recent studies
demonstrate that surrogate decision makers also frequently
experience stress and anxiety during and well after the process
of making treatment decisions for a family member.115 Some
physicians have acknowledged this concern and are willing to
take on this responsibility in appropriate situations.116
115. See, e.g., Ellen Iverson et al., Factors Affecting Stress Experienced
by Surrogate Decision-Makers for Critically Ill Patients: Implications for
Nursing Practice, 30 INTENSIVE CRITICAL CARE NURSING 77, 77-85 (2014); D.
Wendler & Anette Rid, Systematic Review: The Effect on Surrogates of
Making Treatment Decisions for Others, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL. MED. 336,
336-46 (2011) (concluding that at least one-third of surrogate decision-makers
experience lasting negative emotional symptoms from making health care
decisions for a loved one).
116. See, e.g., Opinion, April R. Dworetz, End of Life, At Birth, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/05/opinion/end-of-lifeat-birth.html?_r=0 (describing difficult decisions to cease treatment of
extremely premature infants and arguing that “[u]ltimately, parents have the
right to decide, but we physicians must help them make informed decisions”
and adding that she occasionally offers to make the decision for the parents.
“If they agree, they are essentially making the decision, but are shifting the
burden to me. It’s harder for parents to say, ‘I unplugged my baby,’ than to
let the doctor do it.”); Schneiderman, supra note 99, at 131 (describing a
clinical case in which a dying patient’s family requested all life-supportive
measures and the decision of the physicians to withdraw care from the
patient after notifying the family and giving them an opportunity to transfer
the patient or seek judicial intervention and observing that, after the patient
died peacefully, the family “seemed relieved in the end that the physicians
had assumed responsibility for this difficult decision”). Commentators also
have argued persuasively that the costs of the autonomy-based system are
too frequently ignored and should be considered in making end of life
decisions in limited classes of cases. Alexander M. Smith, Beyond Autonomy,
14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 25-27 (1997) (“[M]edical law . . .
[embodies] in the form of legal rules, the prevailing rejection of paternalism
and the widely-held belief that people should be allowed to determine the
shape of their own lives . . . . What is perhaps less obvious, however, is just
how autonomy has crowded out other values and how uncritically it is
used.”); see also Harry R. Moody, From Informed Consent to Negotiated
Consent, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 64, 64-65 (1988) (arguing that autonomy and
paternalism are not, in fact, opposite concepts and suggesting that, in the
context of long term care facility residents, it is ethically appropriate to use
concepts of paternalism to enhance patient autonomy); Hilary Young, Why
Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment Should Not Require “Rasouli
Consent”, 6 MCGILL J. L. & HEALTH 54-104 (2012) (“[W]hen consent is applied
to create de facto entitlements to medical treatment, . . . interests other than
those of the patient become relevant, such as physicians’ interest in not
having to provide nonbeneficial treatment and the public interest in not
having to fund treatment of little or no medical value. Yet the law of
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Although physician concerns about patient and family anxiety
are well-founded, these conversations are integral to helping
patients and families make good choices about end-of-life care.
Avoiding discussions about the patient’s situation may in fact
perpetuate anxiety by prolonging the process of accepting the
illness and deciding about future care.117
In this regard, two commentators have proposed a concept
of “informed assent” to reduce the burden on surrogate decision
makers who must make choices about withholding or
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.118 Research suggests
that family members in these circumstances welcome
physicians’ explicit recommendations.119 The authors describe
informed assent as inviting the patient or family “to defer to
the clinicians’ judgment in favor of withholding or withdrawing
life-sustaining therapy.”120 The idea behind informed assent is
to convey to families as surrogate decision makers “the
information that the clinicians are prepared to relieve them of
unwanted burdens of making life-or-death decisions.”121 This
proposal for a process of informed assent, while unlikely to be
widely adopted, further emphasizes the importance of
physicians’ initiating and leading conversations that the
patient and family may otherwise have little appetite to
informed consent is exclusively patient-centered and does not allow these
factors to be considered . . . .” and adding that, although she does not
advocate that physicians have a unilateral right to withhold or withdraw
treatment, future policy in this area should consider interests beyond patient
autonomy-based entitlements to care.).
117. See Rachelle E. Bernacki et al., Communication About Serious
Illness Care Goals: A Review and Synthesis of Best Practices, J. AM. MED.
ASS’N, E1, E2 (Oct. 20, 2014).
118. See J. Randall Curtis & Robert A. Burt, Point:The Ethics of
Unilateral “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders: The Role of “Informed Assent”, 132
CHEST 748, 748-50 (2007) [hereinafter Curtis & Burt, The Role of “Informed
Assent”].
119. See Renee D. Stapleton et al., Clinician Statements and Family
Satisfaction with Family Conferences in the Intensive Care Unit, 43 CRITICAL
CARE MED. 1679, 1679-84 (2006).
120. See Curtis & Burt, The Role of “Informed Assent”, supra note 118,
at 748 (arguing that informed assent is sometimes an appropriate, ethical
alternative to informed consent).
121. See id. at 749 (providing also a discussion of three categories of
withholding or withdrawing life-supportive measures and suggesting
circumstances under which physicians could unilaterally decide not to offer
particular types of care).
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undertake.122
Policies to encourage quality care at the end of life should
be specific enough to encourage timely discussions and
informed decision making but sufficiently flexible to
incorporate the preferences of individual patients. While some
patients may prefer to remain in a state of ignorance, which is
their right, there is surely another group of patients who will
prefer the truth, and it is the physician’s obligation in these
cases to provide it. Determining in which group a particular
patient places herself is simple—the physician need only ask,
“What would you like to know about your prognoses and
treatment options?” (Even this question may prove difficult to
ask, however, because it posits that there is something to
know, and therefore tips the physician’s hand). Nevertheless,
the onus is on the physician to initiate the conversation, even if
the patient then chooses to end it.
The development and publication of guidelines for
excellence in physician-patient communication may, by itself,
fail to bring about widespread changes in physician practice for
another set of reasons. In addition to an understandable
reluctance to have difficult conversations with dying patients,
many physicians still value the exercise of individual clinical
judgment above compliance with even the best of guidelines,123
and may therefore decline to follow them.
Moreover,
physicians often remain unaware of guidelines, even those
developed and published by organizations in their field of
specialty.124
There is also some suspicion that practice
122. In any event, the idea of replacing informed consent with assent
raises serious ethical concerns, since physicians’ prognostication skills are
necessarily imperfect and a patient’s silence in response to a medical
recommendation may not necessarily reflect comprehension of the
recommendation, let alone agreement based on understanding.
See
Constantine A. Manthous, Counterpoint: Is It Ethical to Order “Do Not
Resuscitate” Without Patient Consent?, 132 CHEST 751, 751-54 (2007)
(rejecting as unethical the option of entering a DNR order for a patient
without the patient’s consent and suggesting that even informed assent risks
arbitrary outcomes because it relies exclusively on the physician’s nonomniscient judgment that CPR is medically inappropriate in a particular
patient’s case).
123. See Stefan Timmermans, From Autonomy to Accountability: The
Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Professional Power, 48 PERSPECS. IN
BIOLOGY & MED. 490, 494 (2005).
124. See Dimitri A. Christakis & Frederick P. Rivara, Pediatricians’
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guidelines seek to reduce cost as much as to improve clinical
practice,125 a concern that, in the case of end-of-life care
practices, could be fatal to the implementation of the guidelines
if it provokes sufficient opposition from pro-life groups.
Ideally, health care providers, institutions, and policy
analysts should reach consensus on how to approach the
discussion of end-of-life issues, including an explicit statement
of problems and goals, and an elaboration of clear, evidencebased standards for best practices.
This would improve
transparency and thus help allay at least some physicians’
concerns about adopting best practices guidelines.
The
challenge is to implement these consensus-based practices
consistently, beginning with the earliest steps of medical
education, so that the culture of care at the end of life changes
from one of denial and avoidance to one of open communication
and cooperative decision making. The process will take time
and consistent effort but may, eventually, reach a tipping point
where timely and informative conversations will become the
norm.
Recent developments promise improvement. For those
patients who are willing and able to engage in advance care
planning, there is evidence of real progress with the
proliferation of Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment
(POLST), which allow patients and surrogates to make and
document detailed, situation-specific medical orders for end-oflife care.126 Unlike other advance directives that patients
complete with attorneys or on their own, the POLST document

Awareness of and Attitudes About Four Clinical Practice Guidelines, 101
PEDIATRICS 825, 825-830 (1998) (surveying pediatricians about their
awareness of four pediatric practice guidelines and finding a range of
awareness that varied from 16% to 64%).
125. See Timmermans, supra note 123, at 496 (“The path of professional
development is treacherous because the line between adopting and enforcing
is easily blurred” and that “clinical practice guidelines are strongly associated
with quality improvement and cost-control initiatives.”).
126. See Editorial, Care at the End of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2012, at
SR10, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/end-of-life-healthcare.html (noting that 15 states have enacted laws authorizing the use of
POLST forms and nearly 30 other states are considering such legislation); see
also POLST, http://www.polst.org (last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (providing
detailed information about these forms, their legal status and
implementation).
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requires the participation of the treating physician, who
reviews the various options with the patient, signs the form
along with the patient, and includes it in the patient’s medical
chart. The POLST paradigm has spread rapidly in the last
decade and is now in some stage of development or
implementation in approximately 45 states.127 In states that
choose to mandate the utilization of POLST forms for seriously
ill patients, the paradigm will have the effect of routinizing
end-of-life discussions with patients and surrogates. While this
process hardly guarantees the substance and quality of these
discussions, it at least requires physicians to have the
conversation.
Autonomy is meaningful only when it is exercised within a
collaborative relationship between physician and patient, with
the physician acting as an advisor as well as a source of
information.
Focused physician training to improve
communication and encourage shared decision making will
lead to improvement over the basic model of informed consent.
SDM provides opportunities for the physician to evaluate the
patient’s understanding of his or her medical situation and
encourages physicians to offer their own values (such as
opinions about whether a particular medical technology is in
the patient’s best interests) rather than simply providing
patients with information and asking for a decision. Shared
decision making, when the patient and physician are willing
and able to participate meaningfully, has the potential to
ameliorate the problem of overutilization of care at the end of
life. As such, this model of decision making should constitute
an important part of medical training and practice.
B.

The Important Role of Decision Aids

Decision aids appear to have a significant impact on
patient decision making in many medical contexts and will no
doubt continue to play an important role in improving
communication between physicians and patients or

127. See POLST, supra note 126. POLST received tremendous support
from the Institute of Medicine in its 2014 report. See IOM, DYING IN
AMERICA, supra note 2, at 17, 173-81

49

786

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:3

surrogates.128 Videos have been used as patient decision aids
since the 1990s in a variety of clinical settings, including
treatment for ischemic heart disease129 and PSA screening.130
More recently, video decision aids have been proposed as a way
to help patients and their surrogates make better-informed
decisions regarding end of life care. These aids are a promising
development that can improve the possibilities for truly
informed decision making. To the extent that they deliberately
or inadvertently manipulate the patient’s perceptions of the
best choice, however, they may disserve that goal.
A leading figure in the field is Dr. Angelo Volandes, an
internal medicine physician at Massachusetts General Hospital
and faculty member at the Harvard Medical School. Together
with his colleagues (the VIDEO Consortium), Volandes has
created video decision aids for advance care planning and
conducted an extensive program of studies to test their
efficacy.131 One video tested in these studies depicts the daily
128. See Chuck Alston et al., Shared Decision-Making Strategies for Best
Care: Patient Decision Aids, NAT’L ACA. OF MED. (Sept. 2014),
http://nam.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/SDMforBestCare2.pdf;
Glyn
Elwyn et al., Shared Decision Making: Developing the OPTION Scale for
Measuring Patient Involvement, 12 QUALITY SAFETY HEALTH CARE 93 (2003)
(describing the development and testing of a measurement tool to evaluate
patient involvement and satisfaction in medical decision making); E.A.G.
Joosten et al., Systematic Review of the Effects of Shared Decision-Making on
Patient Satisfaction, Treatment Adherence and Health Status, 77
PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 219 (2008) (reviewing research
evaluating shared decision making approaches in the context of a variety of
health conditions and concluding that shared decision making is helpful in
reaching treatment agreements); Annette M. O’Connor et al., Modifying
Unwarranted Variations in Health Care: Shared Decision Making Using
Patient
Decision
Aids,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS
(Oct.
7,
2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/10/07/hlthaff.var.63.full.pd
f (reviewing the evidence in support of using decision aids and recommending
strategies to increase utilization and ensure quality of decision aids).
129. See Matthew W. Morgan et al., Randomized, Controlled Trial of an
Interactive Videodisc Decision Aid for Patients with Ischemic Heart Disease,
15 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 685, 685-86 (2000).
130. Dominick L. Frosch et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial
Comparing Internet and Video to Facilitate Patient Education for Men
Considering the Prostate Specific Antigen Test, 18 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED.
781, 781-82 (2003).
131. ANGELO E. VOLANDES, THE CONVERSATION: A REVOLUTIONARY PLAN
FOR END-OF-LIFE CARE (2015) [hereinafter VOLANDES, THE CONVERSATION]; see
also ADVANCE CARE PLANNING (ACP) DECISIONS, http://www.acpdecisions.org
(last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
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routine of an elderly woman with advanced dementia. The
other explains three goals-of-care options: life-prolonging care,
including images of simulated CPR and intubation and an
image of a patient on a mechanical ventilator; limited or basic
care, including images of a patient getting antibiotics via a
peripheral intravenous catheter; and comfort care, including
images of a patient on home hospice care receiving
medications. Doctors or other health care professionals may
invite patients to watch either or both videos as appropriate,
depending on the patient and the situation. The videos are
intended to supplement, not replace, doctors’ verbal
explanation of dementia and care options.132
The motivating idea behind these video aids is that, by
improving patients’ understanding of the benefits and risks of
different levels of end-of-life care, the videos can help them
make better-informed decisions about the kind of care they
would prefer – and ideally, to express those preferences in
advance directives, increasing the likelihood that unwanted
care will in be avoided. Volandes and his colleagues have
published approximately 15 peer-reviewed studies to date on
the impact of seeing these videos on different patient groups’
preferences regarding end-of-life care, their knowledge of
relevant care options, and other variables.133 Almost all of
132. See VOLANDES, THE CONVERSATION, supra note 131, at 112-15. For a
systemic overview of decision aids generally and their relationship to shared
decision making, see Glyn Elwyn et al., Investing in Deliberation: A
Definition and Classification of Decision Support Interventions for People
Facing Difficult Health Decisions, 30 MED. DECISION MAKING 701 (2010).
133. Kristy S. Deep et al., ‘It Helps Me See With My Heart’: How Video
Informs Patients’ Rationale for Decisions About Future Care in Advanced
Dementia, 81 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 229 (2010); Andrew S. Epstein et
al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of a Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
Video in Advance Care Planning for Progressive Pancreas and Hepatobiliary
Cancer Patients, 16 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 623 (2013); Andrew S. Epstein et
al., “We Have to Discuss It”: Cancer Patients’ Advance Care Planning
Impressions Following Educational Information About Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation, PSYCHOONCOLOGY (2015); Areej El-Jawahri et al., A
Randomized Controlled Trial of a CPR and Intubation Video Decision
Support Tool for Hospitalized Patients, 30 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. (2015)
[hereinafter El-Jawahri et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of a CPR and
Intubation Video Decision Support Tool]; Areej El-Jawahri et al., Use of Video
to Facilitate End-of-Life Discussions With Patients With Cancer: A
Randomized Controlled Trial, 28 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 305 (2010)
[hereinafter El-Jawahri et al., Use of Video to Facilitate End-of-Life
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these studies have found that participants who watch a video
decision aid are significantly more likely to prefer comfort care
to other end-of-life care options134 and to prefer not to be
resuscitated via CPR, intubated, or put on mechanical
ventilation.135 These findings have been observed for many
Discussions]; Jessica B. McCannon et al., Augmenting Communication and
Decision Making in the Intensive Care Unit with a Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation Video Decision Support Tool: A Temporal Intervention Study,
15 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 1382 (2012); Angelo E. Volandes et al., A
Randomized Controlled Trial of a Goals-of-Care Video for Elderly Patients
Admitted to Skilled Nursing Facilities, 15 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 805 (2012);
Angelo E. Volandes et al., Assessing End-of-Life Preferences for Advanced
Dementia in Rural Patients Using an Educational Video: A Randomized
Controlled Trial, 14 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 169 (2011) [hereinafter Volandes
et al., Assessing End-of-Life Preferences for Advanced Dementia in Rural
Patients]; Angelo E. Volandes et al., Augmenting Advance Care Planning in
Poor Prognosis Cancer with a Video Decision Aid: A Pre-Post Study, 118
CANCER 4331 (2012) [hereinafter Volandes et al., Augmenting Advance Care
Planning]; Angelo E. Volandes et al., Health Literacy Not Race Predicts Endof-Life Care Preferences, 11 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 754 (2008); Angelo E.
Volandes et al., Improving Decision Making at the End of Life With Video
Images, 30 MED. DECISION MAKING 29 (2009) [hereinafter Volandes et al.,
Improving Decision Making at the End of Life With Video Images]; Angelo E.
Volandes et al., Overcoming Educational Barriers for Advance Care Planning
in Latinos with Video Images, 11 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 700 (2008); Angelo E.
Volandes et al., Randomized Controlled Trial of a Video Decision Support
Tool for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Decision Making in Advanced
Cancer, 31 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 380 (2013) [hereinafter Volandes et al.,
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Decision Making]; Angelo E. Volandes et al.,
Using Video Images of Dementia in Advance Care Planning, 167 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MED. 828 (2007); Angelo E. Volandes et al., Using Video Images to
Improve the Accuracy of Surrogate Decision-Making: A Randomized
Controlled Trial, 10 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS’N 575 (2009); Angelo E.
Volandes et al., Video Decision Support Tool for Advance Care Planning in
Dementia: Randomised Controlled Trial, 338 BRITISH MED. J. b1964 (2009)
[hereinafter Volandes et al., Video Decision Support Tool for Advance Care
Planning in Dementia].
134. 10 of 11 studies measuring goals of care preferences found that
those who saw videos were likelier to prefer comfort care than those who did
not.
135. Six of seven studies measuring one or more of these specific
interventions found that those who saw videos were less likely to choose
these forms of life-prolonging care than those who did not. Note that these
results are consistent with those from studies of video decision aids in other,
non-end-of-life clinical settings, which also tended to show that participants
who watch videos are less likely to opt for more aggressive treatments. E.g.,
David Arterburn et al., Introducing Decision Aids At Group Health Was
Linked To Sharply Lower Hip And Knee Surgery Rates And Costs, 31 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 2094 (2012); Frosch et al., supra note 130; Morgan et al., supra note
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different types of patients: seniors in doctors’ offices and rural
health clinics, for whom end-of-life care is not imminent;
elderly persons at skilled nursing facilities following acute
hospital care, for whom it may well be a more pressing concern;
patients suffering from advanced gliomas or gastrointestinal
cancers with poor prognoses, for whom end-of-life issues are
urgent; and persons of various races/ethnicities, religions,
education levels, and health literacy levels.
Insofar as a greater preference for comfort or palliative
care is desirable for the reasons discussed earlier, the research
suggests that video decision aids can increase the likelihood of
outcomes that are both medically and economically beneficial.
More importantly for this paper’s central theme, the research
also indicates that video decision aids may improve the process
of end-of-life decision making in several ways, including: (1) by
making patients better informed about their options; (2) by
making them more likely to have “the conversation” with their
doctors and more likely to memorialize their end-of-life care
preferences in an advance directive; and (3) by helping them to
feel better about this difficult decision.
First, the research indicates that patients who use video
decision aids are better informed about their end-of-life choices.
Generally speaking, using video decision aids can ensure not
only that each patient receives a certain minimum of
information relevant to their end-of-life decisions – thus
addressing the problem created when either the patient or the
physician is reluctant to broach the subject at all – but also
that each patient receives the same basic information, in a
clearly structured format (which of course may be augmented
by additional communication by the physician).136
More
specifically, in six of seven of the studies in which Volandes and
his group have compared what participants who watched the
videos knew about relevant end-of-life facts (advanced
dementia or the likely outcomes from life-prolonging care) to
what those who didn’t watch knew, participants demonstrated
that they were more accurately informed about the prospects
for the end of life after watching the video.137
129.
136. VOLANDES, THE CONVERSATION, supra note 131, at 112.
137. Significant effects for the video decision aids on knowledge of the
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Second, one recent study indicates that video decision aids
also facilitate doctor-patient communication and that patients
who watch videos are more likely to translate their preferences
into advance directives that guide their subsequent treatment
when they are no longer able to express their wishes.
Participants were 150 inpatients who were suffering from
various advanced diseases and had poor prognoses – less than
one year to live. Those who watched a video depicting CPR and
intubation were significantly more likely than those who did
not to have a discussion about these interventions with their
inpatient doctors before being discharged from the hospital.
And while the proportion of patients in each group with
documented advance orders to withhold treatment was about
the same before the study began, those who watched the video
were significantly more likely to have such orders in their
records as of the date of discharge.138
Third, video decision aids may help patients to feel better
about the decision making process. One therapeutic benefit is
that video decision aids appear to reduce the uncertainty that
people feel in making end-of-life care decisions. In one study,
the researchers specifically compared participants’ level of
uncertainty regarding their choices for care in case of advanced
dementia before and after watching the dementia video, and
found that watching the video led them to be more certain
about their preferences.
In several other studies, fewer
participants asked to choose a level of care option selected
“uncertain” after watching a video than they did before. To the
depicted condition and/or intervention were found in: El-Jawahri et al., A
Randomized Controlled Trial of a CPR and Intubation Video Decision
Support Tool, supra note 133 (video vs. no video); El-Jawahri et al., Use of
Video to Facilitate End-of-Life Discussions, supra note 133 (video plus verbal
vs. verbal only); McCannon et al., Augmenting Communication and Decision
Making in the Intensive Care Unit, supra note 133 (video vs. no video);
Volandes et al., Augmenting Advance Care Planning, supra note 133 (video
vs. no video); Volandes et al., Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Decision
Making, supra note 133 (video plus verbal vs. verbal only); Volandes et al.,
Video Decision Support Tool for Advance Care Planning in Dementia, supra
note 133 (video plus verbal vs. verbal only). The only study in which
significant effects were not found was Epstein et al., A Randomized
Controlled Trial of a Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Video, supra note 133
(video vs. verbal only).
138. El-Jawahri et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of a CPR and
Intubation Video Decision Support Tool, supra note 133.
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extent that being certain feels better than being uncertain –
that is, being confident is good hedonically139 – video aids have
therapeutic value. And to the extent that patients who are
more certain about their care preferences are less passive
about their own health care-related choices,140 video aids may
have therapeutic value in that respect as well.
It is important, however, to point out two basic limitations
of the empirical research supporting the claimed benefits of
video decision aids. First, in all but one of the studies
comparing the preferences and/or knowledge of participants
who saw a video about dementia and/or goals of end-of-life care
to those who only heard a verbal presentation of that
information, participants in the video group also heard the
verbal presentation first. None of those studies, therefore,
allow us to determine whether the reported effects of the video
on goals of care preferences or knowledge were due to the video
itself as opposed to the mere repetition of the relevant
information, first in verbal form and then in the video. The
potentially confounding effect of the repetition of the
information would seem to be especially problematic with
regard to the measurement of knowledge effects immediately
after the experimental manipulation.141 Indeed, in the one
study that appears to have controlled for this potential
confound,142 the researchers found no difference in the increase
in knowledge about CPR and mechanical ventilation produced
by exposure to a verbal account versus the video. Second,
assuming for sake of argument that video decision aids both
increase patients’ knowledge about their end-of-life options and
139. See, e.g., Hart Blanton et al., Overconfidence as Dissonance
Reduction, 37 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, (2001).
140. See Volandes et al., Improving Decision Making at the End of Life
with Video Images, supra note 133, at 33.
141. “Repetition is one of the most powerful variables affecting memory .
. . . [T]he fact that repetition improves retention . . . seems beyond dispute.”
Douglas Hintzman, Repetition and Memory, 10 PSYCHOL. OF LEARNING AND
MOTIVATION 47, 47 (1976). The knowledge measures in the Volandes et al.
studies are essentially measures of recall, and should thus be subject to this
general principle.
142. Andrew S. Epstein et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of a
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Video in Advance Care Planning for
Progressive Pancreas and Hepatobiliary Cancer Patients, 16 J. OF PALLIATIVE
MED. (2013).
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incline them to prefer comfort care, none of the published
studies strongly support the inference that (as some might
suppose) the two outcomes are causally connected—that people
who watch video decision aids are more likely to choose comfort
care because they understand their end-of-life options better.143
Still, the consistent finding that watching video decision
aids makes people more likely to choose comfort care is
provocative and demands further investigation. Do the videos
have this effect because they improve end-of-life decision
making or, on the contrary, because they impair it by biasing
patients’ choices? Although the research does not yet permit a
definitive answer, there is some evidence for both.144
On the one hand, video decision tools can influence
judgment processes about end-of-life choices in a positive way.
First, the use of video may increase patients’ attention to the
information being presented, making the information likelier to
be noticed, remembered, and used in subsequent decision

143. This inference could be indicated, for instance, by a basic
mediational analysis. Specifically, a traditional mediational analysis would
support the inference that watching a video decision aid makes people more
likely to prefer comfort care because it makes them more knowledgeable
about end-of-life outcomes if it showed that (a) watching video makes
participants significantly likelier to prefer comfort care; (b) when increased
knowledge is added to the model as a potential mediator of that main effect,
watching video significantly predicts increased knowledge and increased
knowledge significantly predicts a greater preference for comfort care, but (c)
the direct path from watching video to the degree of preference for comfort
care is no longer statistically significant. See Reuben M. Barron & David A.
Kenny, The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological
Research: Conceptual, Strategic, & Statistical Considerations, 51 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1173, 1179-81 (1986). None of the studies,
however, report any form of this statistical test.
144. The following discussion applies to video aids for end-of-life decision
making generally. Although we have Volandes and his colleagues’ videos in
mind, we have been unable to obtain access to the actual videos used in their
studies. Links in their published studies are no longer active and other
attempts to access the material have been unsuccessful. We rely, therefore,
on the descriptions of the videos in peer-reviewed publications, as well as
what we infer to be still images or brief clips taken from those videos that
appear in other, publicly available material and correspond to the published
descriptions. Talks at Google, Angelo Volandes: “The Conversation”—Talks
at
Google,
YOUTUBE
(Mar.
24,
2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAOq1_qIstg&noredirect=1 (showing CPR
on a mannequin at 34:53-35:05).
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making.145
Second, considerable research on multimedia
learning attests to the benefits of well-designed visual
instruction.146 Dual coding theory147 posits that people think
both visually and verbally. By offering visual stimuli, video
decision aids should appeal more directly to the visual
processing channel, and may be especially effective for people
whose learning style inclines toward the visual.148 Third, and
perhaps most importantly, a video depicting a person with
advanced dementia or a patient undergoing CPR or mechanical
ventilation is likely to induce stronger, more confident
understanding than a verbal description of those things.
Seeing the video provides patients with a vicarious form of
experiential knowledge, and a person who has had the
experience of x can imagine and remember x in ways that
someone lacking that experience cannot.149 Volandes and
colleagues have often remarked that watching these videos
enables patients to “imagine the unimaginable” and begin to
understand what it might be like to be in the depicted person’s
position150 – surely a component of truly informed decision
making.
On the other hand, video decision tools may also bias endof-life choices. One concern is that video decision aids may
prompt overly emotional decision making.151 Volandes and
colleagues acknowledge this risk,152 and their descriptions of
145. See e.g., Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in the
Courtroom, 49 J. OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 659, 661-63 (1985).
146. See e.g., RICHARD E. MAYER, MULTIMEDIA LEARNING (2d ed. 2001).
147. ALLAN PAIVIO, IMAGERY AND VERBAL PROCESSES (1971); ALLAN
PAIVIO, MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS: A DUAL CODING APPROACH (1990).
148. RITA DUNN, Capitalizing on College Students’ Learning Styles:
Theory, Practice, and Research, in PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO USING LEARNING
STYLES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 3-18 (2000).
149. David Lewis, What Experience Teaches, in THE NATURE OF
CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 579, 579-95 (1997).
150. Angelo E. Volandes et al., The Psychology of Using and Creating
Video Decision Aids for Advance Care Planning, PSYCHOL. OF DECISION
MAKING IN MED. AND HEALTH CARE, 190, 190 (2007) [hereinafter Volandes et
al., The Psychology of Using and Creating Video Decision Aids for Advance
Care Planning].
151. See id.
152. See e.g., Volandes et al., The Psychology of Using and Creating
Video Decision Aids for Advance Care Planning, supra note 150, at 193;
Volandes et al., Assessing End-of-Life Preferences for Advanced Dementia in
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their videos and the production process indicate that they have
taken some pains to avoid overly emotion-provoking content.153
Nevertheless, the fact that even Volandes’ most in-depth
discussions of his filmmaking strategies and goals make only
the most passing reference to viewers’ emotional responses154
indicates that the research may not have adequately accounted
for potential emotional bias. Whether and to what extent
emotional responses to video decision aids should be considered
as impairing or enhancing good judgment is itself a highly
debatable matter. Some emotions (for instance, moderate
sadness and/or sympathy) may facilitate good decision making
about end-of-life care, whereas others (e.g., disgust) may not.
None of the studies by Volandes and colleagues have measured
specific emotional responses to the videos, however, so we
simply do not know how strong those effects may be or whether
they played any role in participants’ end-of-life care
preferences.
Second, video decision aids may frame the information on
which a decision is to be based in such a way as to bias the
decision. Generally speaking, people are more willing to incur
risks or costs to avoid a loss than to obtain or preserve the
equivalent gain (prospect theory or loss aversion).155 If the endof-life scenario is framed so as to characterize or make salient
the patient’s death, that would likely be perceived as a loss
relative to the status quo (living patient), and the decision
maker would be more inclined to incur costs – here, the pain
and risk of life-prolonging treatment – to avoid that loss. If, in
contrast, the same scenario is framed to make salient the
patient’s continuing diminished existence, that would likely be
Rural Patients Using an Educational Video: A Randomized Controlled Trial,
supra note 133, at 174.
153. See e.g., VOLANDES, THE CONVERSATION, supra note 131, at 104-06.
154. Angelo Volandes et al., Audio-Video Decision Support for Patients:
The Documentary Genre as a Basis for Decision Aids, 16 HEALTH
EXPECTATIONS: AN INT’L J. OF PUB. PARTICIPATION IN HEALTH CARE AND
HEALTH POL’Y 80 (2011) (not mentioned); Volandes et al., The Psychology of
Using and Creating Video Decision Aids for Advance Care Planning, supra
note 150, at 193 (mentioned in passing); Volandes et al., Assessing End-ofLife Preferences for Advanced Dementia in Rural Patients, supra note 133, at
174 (mentioned in passing).
155. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453-58 (1981).
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perceived as a (minimal) gain relative to the status quo, and
the decision maker would be less inclined to incur the same
costs to preserve the gain. A video decision aid showing a
patient with advanced dementia, for instance, makes salient
the patient’s diminished life rather than the patient’s death as
a loss of life, and hence would be predicted to incline decision
makers against life-prolonging treatment.
Third, watching the videos may trigger patients’ use of the
affect heuristic,156 which could impair end-of-life decision
making both by oversimplifying it and by biasing its outcome.
Most activities involve both risks and benefits, which tend to be
positively correlated (if correlated at all). “Activities that bring
great benefits may be high or low in risk but activities that are
low in benefit are unlikely to be high in risk (if they were, they
would be proscribed).”157 According to the affect heuristic,
however, people tend to perceive risks and benefits as inversely
correlated.158 “If [people] like an activity, they are moved to
judge the risks as low and the benefits as high; if they dislike
it, they tend to judge the opposite – high risk and low
benefit.”159 Thus, a person’s affective response converts what
should be a complex decision – such as whether to use lifeprolonging treatment in cases of advanced dementia – into a
simpler, less conflicted judgment by aligning the pros and cons.
The video decision aids, although apparently eschewing
dramatic emotional appeal, still show distasteful images,
whether of advanced dementia or sternum-breaking CPR, and
the limited data available indicates that viewers respond
aversively to these images.160 If their affective response to the
video is one of dislike, viewers may intuitively regard lifeprolonging treatment as high cost and low benefit and thus to
be avoided, rather than considering more thoughtfully the pros
and cons of what might reasonably be described as a high cost
and (depending on the value placed on continued life) a high
benefit activity.
156. Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, 177 EUR. J. OF OPERATIONAL
RES. 1333, 1338-39 (2007).
157. Id. at 1343.
158. Id. at 1342-43.
159. Id. at 1343.
160. See generally Deep et al., supra note 133.
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It is important to put the critiques in perspective. Video
decision aids may well improve end-of-life decision making to
the extent that their strengths and even their potential biases
help to counteract the judgmental biases likely to exist when
patients or their surrogates make these decisions without the
videos. The relevant question, that is, is not whether video
decision aids lead to optimal decision making, but rather
whether they are likely to lead to better decision making. For
instance, we observed earlier that videos may induce a framing
bias that makes the risks and costs of life-prolonging treatment
more salient relative to its benefits. It’s very possible, however,
that without the videos, patients, especially healthy patients,
would tend to underestimate how bad things are likely to be
toward end of their lives if they should then be suffering from
advanced dementia or terminal cancer. People are generally
poor at affective forecasting, that is, predicting how they will
feel in the future after various life changes, and they are prone
to optimism bias, tending to believe that they will be able to
avoid the bad events that befall others.161 In light of these
default biases, even the biasing effects of video decision aids
could provide a helpful corrective, making it likelier that the
level of care that people receive at the end of life accords with
what they would prefer to receive, even if they are unable to
express those preferences when the end approaches. Moreover,
given the pervasive denial of death in American culture
mentioned earlier, and (relatedly) the “magical thinking” that
leads many patients to “believe that however unlikely a
procedure is to be effective, it will work when applied to their
particular case,”162 decision aids that give patients and their
families a more realistic and a deeper, more experiential
understanding of the actual benefits and costs of lifeprolonging treatment would seem, on balance, to be
worthwhile.
161. On affective forecasting errors, see, e.g., DANIEL GILBERT,
STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006). On optimism bias, see, e.g., Neil D.
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic
Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions from a
Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. OF BEHAV. MED. 481 (1987).
162. Volandes et al., The Psychology of Using and Creating Video
Decision Aids for Advance Care Planning, supra note 150, at 195.
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C. Beyond Informed Consent: Achieving the Goal of Authentic
Choice
Shared decision making and the appropriate use of
decision aids promise much progress beyond the minimum
required by informed consent law towards the goal of truly
informed consent. Nevertheless, even these measures do not
guarantee the authenticity of end-of-life choices.163 The ideal of
authenticity requires that the patient not only understand
intellectually the nature of the treatment and its risks and
benefits, but also have the emotional ability to make these
decisions and a functional value system through which to
evaluate the appropriateness of the choice for him or herself.164
In order to make authentic medical decisions, patients
must be willing to acknowledge that they are dying (which
requires honest information about terminal status and
prognosis from the physician) and to think about and then
articulate to the physician their goals of care—such as
prolongation of life, reduction of suffering, or maintenance of
dignity and independence. The broader goal, then, is to create
an environment and a process that maximizes the opportunity
for patients to make end-of-life decisions using accurate,
comprehensible information and while reflecting on how they
have lived their lives and what they value at the end.
It is difficult to assess how often patient decisions reflect
this sort of authenticity, but it is probably relatively rare
163. See, e.g., Insoo Hyun, Waiver of Informed Consent, Cultural
Sensitivity, and the Problem of Unjust Families and Traditions, 32 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 14, 15 (2002) (describing the role of authentic values in the ideal of
personal autonomy and arguing that informed consent or the waiver of
consent must rest on patient values that are “free of coercive formative
influences.”); see also Daniel Brudney, Choosing for Another: Beyond
Autonomy and Best Interests, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 31-32 (2009)
(describing authenticity as “the capacity to be a particular self, a distinctive
individual . . . .”).
164. One commentator, in discussing decision-making competence,
captures the elements of an authentic decision: “Logically and conceptually,
decision-making competence can be broken down into three distinct rubrics.
They are, respectively, cognitive, emotional, and valuational competence.”
See Kluge, supra note 68, at 297.
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because so many barriers exist. Patients do not know what
questions to ask. Even when patients have questions, fear and
denial of illness or deference to physicians may inhibit them
from asking. The ability to talk openly requires that both
patients and physicians acknowledge what they are feeling and
undertake these conversations despite their inherent emotional
challenges.165 There is no way to mandate this level of
emotional engagement between any individual physician and
patient; it will, if it occurs, depend entirely on the character
and inclinations of the individuals in question. From the
physician’s perspective, authenticity requires physicians to be
emotionally self-aware enough to recognize when they are
avoiding difficult conversations with patients and families and
to correct for this avoidance. Physicians must also have
sufficient emotional intelligence to manage these conversations
with patients and families whose own part in the conversation
is very likely hampered by fear, regret, or grief. Many
physicians very capably engage in these conversations, but
because people vary so much in temperament and their ability
to acknowledge and discuss difficult emotions, it would be
unrealistic to expect all physicians (or patients) to behave this
way. Nevertheless, given the complexity and importance of
end-of-life decisions, striving for authenticity is worth the
effort.
IV. Conclusion
As the baby boomer population continues to age, the
problems surrounding end-of-life care will become both more
prevalent and more complex. Recognizing the acute need to
address the lives and deaths of an aging population, health
policy experts, legislatures, and the medical community are
seeking ways to improve the quality of both communication
165. See Duffy, supra note 113, at 140 (noting that good communication,
in the form of allowing the patient to talk, responding to patients’ emotions,
and building rapport “are not trivial skills. They are the crux of competent
medical care, particularly from the patient’s and the public’s point of view.”);
Diane E. Meier et al., The Inner Life of Physicians and Care of the Seriously
Ill, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3007, 3007-08 (2001) (encouraging physicians to be
self-aware, to acknowledge their emotions as they care for dying patients in
order to improve quality of care and to guard the physician’s own well-being).

http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2

62

2016

AVOIDING OVERTREATMENT

799

and care at the end of life. Part of the solution is to remove the
dividing line between therapeutic and palliative care and to
focus instead on training physicians to integrate the two.166
But that alone will not improve care as desired unless
physicians and patients communicate better about their choices
and the implications of these choices.
Informed consent law, the SDM model, and video decision
aids all can play an important part in trying to reorient
physicians and patients toward truly informed (and perhaps
even authentic) choice, but no legal reform can require that
patients confront their own mortality or that physicians help
them to do so. In end-of-life care, relying on the patient’s
exercise of his autonomous choice is often insufficient to
promote sound medical decision making and, in particular, to
avoid care that is excessive, whether measured by its physical
benefits or its consistency with the patient’s own true values
and preferences. Fear, denial of death, deference to physician
authority, lack of trust, or simple ignorance often makes
patients and families reluctant to initiate discussions about the
uncertain future. Physicians must be more willing to step
outside the comfortable confines of the traditional model of
informed consent, which sometimes allows them to evade
responsibility for the well-being of patients, and initiate
conversations that provide honest information and advice
about end-of-life choices. The process of shared decision
making, if well implemented, represents a significant step
forward, but it requires willingness on the part of individual
physicians and patients to undertake it, which is something
that education or reform can encourage but not compel.
Fully informed and authentic decision-making represents
the gold standard for end-of-life choices. When achieved, this
gold standard means that the patient’s decisions truly satisfy
the goal of autonomy, whether the decision is to receive or
forego all life-prolonging care, or to request something along
166. There is a growing interest in the integration of the modifying
influence of palliative care into the care and culture of the ICU. The IPALICU project seeks to improve palliative care in the ICU by providing a central
repository for exchanging evidence, expertise, and information.
See
Improving
Palliative
Care
in
the
ICU,
CAPC.ORG,
https://www.capc.org/ipal/ipal-icu/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); see also [add
cross-reference to forthcoming article with Kathy Cerminara].
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the continuum of care options. Meaningful communication
between physician and patient is what makes the realization of
autonomy possible. Similarly, where the patient’s wishes are
unknown or in dispute, good care requires meaningful
communication with the patient’s family or appointed proxy
about discontinuing medically inappropriate treatments while
avoiding misunderstandings with the family about the goals of
care. It is important for both physicians and patients to
recognize that ceasing therapeutic care or life-prolonging
measures when they are no longer beneficial is not a failure of
care. In fact, the opposite is true. The conversations needed to
yield this kind of communication, and the emotions that inhere
in those conversations, ask much of physicians because
providing comfort to dying patients and their families requires
physicians to move beyond the idea of cure to a broader notion
of medical care. That broader notion of care, however, can
reduce unwanted suffering and better comport with patients’
true preferences, both of which are surely desirable outcomes
at the end of life.
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